CHAPTER XXII
TERRORIZATION BY BOMBS

CONTENTS OF CHAPTER XXII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Purposes</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Gambling War Bombing</td>
<td>936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>&quot;Black-Hand&quot;</td>
<td>936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Same: Extent of the Problem</td>
<td>937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Same: The Trials of the &quot;Black-Hand&quot; Cases</td>
<td>942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Same: The Futile Raid</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Same: The Purchase of Paroles</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Same: Federal Prosecution</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Same: Bombing as an Organized Crime</td>
<td>947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Same: Summary of Conclusions</td>
<td>947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Political Bombing: The Powers-D'Andrea Feud</td>
<td>948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Same: Race-Rivalry and Political Succession</td>
<td>953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Political Bombing and a Popular Uprising</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Inter-Racial Bombing</td>
<td>956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Same: The Availability of Terrorists in Chicago Produces Terrorism</td>
<td>958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Labor Union Bombing: The Building Trades War</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Same: Psychology of Building Trades Graft</td>
<td>962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Same: &quot;The Law&quot; and the Union Terrorist</td>
<td>965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Same: Psychology of the Direct Actionist Labor Leader</td>
<td>968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>The &quot;Strong Arm&quot; Gangs: The Sweeney Gang</td>
<td>969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Same: Joseph Sangerman's Bombing Crew</td>
<td>971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Same: Life History of a Terrorist</td>
<td>973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Summary of Conclusions</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER XXII

TERRORIZATION BY BOMBS

1. Purposes.

The bomb, timed to give the bomb-thrower ample chance to escape in his fleet automobile, makes furtive destruction safe.¹

The old-fashioned cannon-cracker used thirty years ago by competitors to expose gambling houses, and its successor, the bomb filled with nuts, nails, and deadly missiles, in the Italian quarter, have been improved upon by modern explosives, less dangerous to life but more destructive to property, according to Lieutenant Make Mills, bomb expert for thirty-one years, of the Chicago Police, who laments the difficulties of police and prosecution in combatting bombers.

Bombing, combined with window smashing, sluggery and shooting, has become a profession practiced by specialized crews or gangs. Their apprehension is made difficult by the quick get-away provided by the automobile. Their conviction, should they fortunately be caught, is very difficult because of terrorization of witnesses; the habeas corpus which forestalls the securing of information; lawyers retained at large fees, often crooked, using political influence and bribery and every loophole of the law; the disappearance of material witnesses after indictment, or change of testimony by those appearing, because of bribery or intimidation; the law’s delays and repeated continuances tiring out the witnesses, who live in constant fear while the law drags. Gangsters are able to raise defense funds, often enormous, as the sinews of war against constituted authority.

A study of over three hundred cases of bombings in the last quarter century seems to justify the following classification by motive: gambling wars, “black hand,” political bombing, inter racial conflict, labor union (“‘direct action”), and merchant association (“racketeering”). Instead of discussing bombings in general, the analytical approach, class by class, discloses many problems, social and economic, in the normal life of our city, which underlie the use of terrorism as a means. In presenting history, evidence, interpretation or explanation for each problem, the outstanding fact appears that other cities having the same problems are free from bombing. Why?

¹The slight degree of risk in comparison with the high degree of destructiveness of bombing is vividly stated in an unsparingly condemnatory editorial in the Herald and Examiner of December 4, 1925:

“Bombing may not be the most vicious of our crimes of violence, but it is certainly the most dastardly. It is possible to maintain a certain semblance of respect for the burglar who risks his life, or for the pickpocket who risks his liberty, but the bomber is an utter outcast from humanity. He is a beast who lurks in ambush and never destroys, unless he feels himself absolutely safe. The bomber goes out for blood and destruction with the intention of risking nothing. The business of the Special Grand Jury and of the state’s attorney and of the chief of police is to show that there is risk in the business. It is too much to hope that any bomber on conviction can be hanged, but the consensus of opinion remains, nevertheless, that hanging is too good for them.”

935
Gambling war bombing has already been treated in detail in Chapter XVIII. While there are periods, as in 1907 and in 1928, when the bombings are so frequent and the motives so evident that they are definitely gambling wars, there has been intermittent bombing in gambling since 1901.

The bomb is used in disputes over territory, to intimidate witnesses, to expose to the press and the public the existence of gambling establishments in order to embarrass the police, to force a percentage of profits, and to expose the participation of public officials in gambling graft. Never has there been a conviction of gambling bombers. The indications during the gambling war in 1907 and at other times are that in this field specialized gangs of bombers are hired and that the police know who the bombers are.

3. "Black Hand." "Black Hand" is extortion by letters containing threats. Following are typical examples of letters written for the purpose of extortion. They are anonymous, signed "Black Hand" or "La Mano Nera," indicating the amount, the time and place for the delivery of the money.

This note was sent to Anthony Marino, 852 Gault Court, after his six-year-old boy was kidnapped:

"We took your boy from your house this morning at ten o'clock and he is in good care with us now. All we want is five thousand dollars and the boy will be sent back. If you value your boy's life, don't miss this. Give your money to some friends who will pass the house. Don't forget."

(Signed) "La Mano Nera"

Here follows the letter received by George C. Bour, 8840 Euclid Avenue, a real estate dealer, with offices at 2004 East Seventy-first Street:

"You got some cash. I need $1,000.00. You place the $100.00 bills in an envelope and place it under a board at the northeast corner of Sixty-ninth Street and Euclid Avenue at eleven o'clock to-night. If you place the money there you will live. If you don't, you die. If you report this to the police, I'll kill you when I get out. They may save you the money but they won't save you your life."

(Signed) "Black Hand"

The following letter is extremely polite, which is characteristic of Latin ways and diplomacy. It was written by Joseph Genite, who was arrested in a raid on a "black hand" arsenal, 1001 South Racine Avenue, where dynamite, sawed-off shotguns and revolvers were found:

"Most Gentle Mr. Silvani:

"Hoping that the present will not impress you much, you will be so good as to send me $2,000.00 if your life is dear to you. So I beg you warmly to put them on your door within four days. But if not, I swear this week's time not even the dust of your family will exist. With regards, believe me to be your friends."

Undoubtedly the Sicilians, who compose the overwhelming majority of the Italian population of Chicago, have been victimized by the "black hand" in Sicily, and the Sicilian immigration has brought with it men who were
Terrorization by Bombs

experienced in perpetrating this form of crime. It is not necessary to review the history of organized crime in Sicily under the name of the "Mafia." The central point is that from the same provinces and villages in Sicily has come immigration to various cities in the United States. In some American cities, the practice of extortion by the "black hand" method, including not only the threatening letter but bombing and murder, has thrived; in others there was a similar beginning but in time the practice has decreased and finally has been wiped out. Milwaukee is now free of bombing and mystery murders in its Italian community, which were common there until a few years ago.

In the study of the "Black Hand" in Chicago, over three hundred cases have been considered, which have occurred in the last twenty-five years. The "black hand" operations are limited almost entirely to the Sicilian neighborhoods on West Taylor Street and vicinity, on Grand Avenue and vicinity, on Oak Street and vicinity, and in the little Italian neighborhood on the south side, Wentworth Avenue.

The police call every mystery murder in the Italian community (murders in which no information is forthcoming) a "black hand" murder. If the police succeed in discovering a threat by letter for the purpose of extortion, followed by either a bombing or a killing, it is more definitely "Black Hand." No disclosure in any court has established a "black hand" society of national or international proportions. The fact is that "black hand" is only a method, a modus operandi. It may be a method used by an individual or a small group of four to ten people, or it may be a method of the traditional Camorra and Mafia which emerges when the large group aids in the defense of apprehended criminals.

If, in late years, bombing and murders have not been ascribed to "black hand," it is not because threats of extortion have not been common, but because the modus operandi has been changed and the threats do not come by letter. One of the probable reasons for the present rarity of the threat by letter is that the perpetrators lay themselves open to prosecution in the Federal Courts, which have occasionally succeeded in convicting such criminals. In Sicily, where telephones are even now rare, the threat was usually communicated by letter. In the earlier days it was thus in Chicago. The letter has partly disappeared because other ways of communication have become as available.

4. Same: Extent of the Problem.

The "Black Hand" was discussed most intensively in the first decade of this century, both in Chicago and in the United States. As early as 1907 a society was formed to combat the "Black Hand" and its sinister activities in various American cities. The "White Hand" Society, composed of Italians, had as its object cooperation with the police and the law. In Chicago it was supported by the Italian Chamber of Commerce, the local Italian newspaper and several Italian and Sicilian fraternal orders. A thorough campaign was launched to rid the country of the "black hander," whose parasitic means of livelihood was blackening the good name of his worthy countrymen. These crusaders employed detectives to hunt out the lair of the extortionists and to place this information at the disposal of the police. Investigators were sent to Italy and Sicily to dig into the past histories of notorious "black
Illinois Crime Survey

handers,” with a view toward deportation, on the ground of illegal entrance into this country.

The Italian Consul Guido Sabetta, who was very active in this work, and Chief of Police Shippy were threatened. Stephen Malato was the attorney of the Society.

As a result of its investigation, the White Hand Society published a booklet showing saloon dives in the Italian colonies of the large American cities as the breeding places of “black hand” crime. It was explained that:

“In these colonies, undisturbed by the local authorities, and showing indifference to every provision of the law, are certain saloons which are retreats for the worst elements of the Italian population; those who are generally known as the authors of crime. The difficulty of extraditing these undesirables and the differences between the police systems of Italy and of the United States are also held responsible for crime among the Italians.”

A series of fresh bombings in widely scattered parts of the city caused the White Hand Society to intensify its efforts to stamp out this scourge. The Society narrowed its work to cooperation with the police department, as it was a difficult task for the ordinary police officer and the detective, familiar only with American conditions, to identify and suppress the criminal gangs in the foreign colonies. The vigilant assistance of such a Society as the White Hand was expected to prove of great value. In explaining the audacity of the “black handers,” the leaders of the Society called attention to the influence of certain vicious and lawless saloon-keepers in the Italian district. These saloon-keepers had learned to take an active part in ward and precinct politics, to court and obtain the favor of the bosses and the “ward heelers.” One of the results of these affiliations was the “let alone” policy toward them by the police department. To remedy this situation the Society recommended that more Italian policemen be added to the force. These were to be posted in the Italian areas to supplement the existing force in its efforts to track down the extortioners. Stephen A. Malato actually succeeded in securing indictments and convictions in certain cases; as for example, in tracking down Vincenzo Geraci, who had by threats of violence attempted to extort a large sum from Dr. Cuttrea.

The White Hand Society seems to have remained dormant after its campaign to get some Italians appointed on the police force. In 1910 it again became active, which resulted in Dr. Joseph Damiani, president, and Dr. C. Voleni, former president of the White Hand, being marked for death, because of their persistent efforts to eradicate the “Black Hand” organization. Since then little is heard of it.

A conversation with Stephen Malato recently corroborated the oft repeated statement that in his observation of thirty-five years in Chicago, the “black hand” has never been more than the method of small groups of criminals, loosely organized, and not a formal, large society of any proportions.

That the White Hand Society did not succeed in wiping out “black hand” operations is evidenced by the following list—the first published March 17, 1911, in an article in the Chicago Daily Tribune. It gives the
Terrorization by Bombs

unsolved murders in the Italian quarters of the city for the year 1910 and until March, 1911, as follows:

For the Year 1910

Jan. 6 Ben Cinene, 60 years old; shot while in his bed, at 500 Oak Street.
Jan. 27 Phillipi Pemovario, 35 years, stabbed; 456 North Peoria Street.
Feb. 7 Joe Loverde, 26 years, shot while in his home; 1117 Milton Street.
Mar. 17 Carmelo Crape, 37 years, found with throat cut and knife sticking in neck, in a rear room of his store; 1101 Larrabee Street.
Apr. 24 Vincenzo Coetzara, 38 years, shot while in his saloon; 913 Gault Court.
Apr. 26 Gartano Disolvo, 26 years, shot twice and stabbed while in front of his home; 1108 Gault Court.
May 1 John Landani, 31 years, shot while in front of his home; 1075 Vernon Park Place.
June 5 Phillipi Caralano, 39 years, shot; Sixteenth and State streets.
June 29 Dominick Lomano, nine months old, killed in his mother's arms by a stray bullet intended for Griffith; suspected man escaped.
June 29 Tony Griffin, 36 years, shot; 904 Townsend Street.
June 29 Leonardo Belloli, 47 years, shot; 853 Gault Court.
Aug. 15 Joseph Gelino, 24 years, shot while in his home; 905 Aberdeen Street; suspected man arrested, tried, and acquitted for lack of evidence.
Aug. 21 Dominico Dines, 40 years, stabbed four times; 867 Sedgwick Street; in quarrel forced by man who escaped.
Aug. 21 Amlio Fialano, 27 years, shot; 742 Ewing Street; in same manner.
Aug. 28 James Rivella, 22 years, shot while at Polk and Jefferson streets; in same manner.
Sept. 4 Peter Gambino, 48 years, shot; 564 DeKoven Street; same manner.
Sept. 13 Phillipi Partaloni, 36 years, shot; 878 Gault Court.
Sept. 25 Tony Armond, 35 years, beaten to death at 4635 South Paulina Street.
Sept. 27 Sam Faticcota, 54 years; stabbed in Sebo Street, in altercation with a man whose name he refused to divulge.
Oct. 2 Dario Brizzolari, 35 years, beaten to death while passing between Forty-first and Forty-second Streets.
Nov. 1 Pascoal Quercha, 42 years, shot while at 929 South May Street; in altercation with man who was arrested and acquitted for lack of evidence.
Nov. 27 Paul Monina, 23 years; 1230 Penn Street.
Nov. 27 Charles Sagliona, 28 years, shot; same manner, same place; no arrest.
Dec. 4 Alfonso Testo, 43 years, stabbed; Mather and Jefferson streets.
Dec. 5 John Kampa, 30 years, stabbed; 1524 Milwaukee Avenue.

1911

Jan. 21 Carmelo Tumminia, 40 years, shot; Elm and Sedgwick streets.
Jan. 29 Giuseppe Abita, 24 years, shot; 1021 South Paulina Street.
Feb. 3 Pasquale Laventine, 22 years, shot; 942 Hope Street.
Feb. 17 Vincenzo Subio, 49 years, shot; 501 Oak Street.
Illinois Crime Survey

Feb. 20 Vito Cappitelli, 33 years, shot in provoked altercation, at Washington and Union streets. Murderer escaped.
Mar. 9 Tony DeMa, 40 years, shot in altercation; 265 Alexander Street; no arrests.
Mar. 13 Pasquale Mancadaro, shot; 807 West Taylor Street.
Mar. 14 Antonio Dugo, shot; 500 Oak Street; by bullet which first passed through the body of Phillip Maniscalco.

On June 2, 1915, a review of "black hand" activities appeared in the Record-Herald:

"Five persons were shot in May alone. In 1911 the dead numbered forty; in 1912, thirty-three; in 1913, thirty-one; in 1914, forty-two."

The following are shootings reported from January to May, 1915, which were all ascribed to "black hand":

Jan. 5 Frank Marino, 2247 West Grand Avenue; shot by Frank Minnine, 602 North Curtiss Street, who battled with detectives, then said that Marino and he were the "Black Hand."
Mar. 24 Frank Monaco, 520 Hobbie Street; fired upon twice by man carrying sawed-off shotgun, but escaped uninjured. Had received letters demanding five hundred dollars.
May 2 Fannie Baceventi, seven years old, slain by revolver bullet fired at Joseph Cutea, 827 Milton Avenue. An hour later when Cutea returned he was shot down by sawed-off shotgun. He recovered.
May 4 Detective Sergeant Joseph McGuire shot in leg by friend of a prisoner he was taking to police station.
May 20 Vincent Falsule, 910 Cambridge Avenue (old Galt Court), shot in back and thigh from ambush, a block from his home.
May 27 Frank Mezzatesta, 1226 Frontier Street; shot in head and shoulder in daylight, at Elm and Larrabee streets.

The throwing of bombs, which resulted from not heeding demands made in threatening letters, in the first five months of 1915, follows:

Jan. 4 Tony Costello, received bomb in mail, but it failed to explode.
Jan. 14 Frank Cuccia's home and saloon, at 876 Townsend Street, blown to pieces. Genevieve Cuccia, 14 years old, hurt when buried beneath debris.
Jan. 25 Michael Ballagala's home, at 827 Gilpin Place, damaged slightly by bomb exploded in front.
Feb. 11 Mrs. Antonio Locascio's building, at 940 Milton Avenue, fired and police found two bombs in basement.
Apr. 6 J. B. Roti's wholesale market, at 920 West Grand Avenue, blown to pieces and windows in vicinity shattered. Frank Roti, brother of owner, was president of Western Savings Bank, which failed.
Apr. 8 Joseph Coco's home and market, at 2262 Wentworth Avenue, wrecked and he and his family were blown out of bed.
Apr. 26 Joseph Maldeno's building, at 1016 South Morgan Street, blown up at midnight.
Apr. 26 Bomb blew out doorway in building at 1150 West Grand Avenue, where C. Cirrincione had grocery.
Terrorization by Bombs

May 6  John Jarbotlo's home, at 2312 West Ohio Street, wrecked; adjoining structure damaged.
May 13 Mrs. John Miller's home, at 1016 Milton Avenue, wrecked.
May 16 Michael Deddo's building, at 613 South Racine Avenue, blown to pieces.
May 20 Peter Carosillo's building, at 2603 West Chicago Avenue, dynamited.

An article in the Daily News, May 25, 1913, acquaints us with the annual profits of the "Black Hand":

"In the first ninety-three days of this year, 55 bombs were detonated in the spaghetti zone. Not one of the 55, so far as can be determined, was set for any reason other than the extraction of blackmail. A detective of experience in the Italian quarter estimates that ten pay tribute to one who is sturdy enough to resist until he is warned by a bomb. Freely conceding that this is all guess work, then 550 men will have paid the Mano Nera since January 1. The Dirty Mitt never asks for less than $1,000. If a compromise of $200 was reached in each of the 550 cases, 'Black Handers' profited by $110,000 in 93 days. That's an average of $1,111 a day, which is fair profit for the expenditure of five two-cent stamps, a dollar's worth of powder, and 15 quarts of wood alcohol chianti, that being the usual ratio. Perhaps these figures are inaccurate in detail, but they are conservative enough en masse. Well informed Italians have never put the year's tribute to the 'Black Hand' at less than half a million dollars."

Bomb-throwing as a hand-maiden of "black hand" helped in reaping a rich yearly harvest in cash from the citizens of this community. But that is not all. Aside from the tribute levied and the destruction of much property, the "black hand" outrages in Chicago decreased the value of real estate in the district where the extortionists operate. Bernard P. Clettenberg, real estate dealer and former alderman, explained the reason:

"I, personally, have no doubt that the 'black hand' killings have decreased the value of property, and I believe the police could have done more than they have. But proving is another question. Sooner or later some lawyer will attempt it and if he succeeds the bond of the chief of police may be brought to the foreground.

"These outrages started eleven or twelve years ago. Years ago the residents were Swedish. Many of them tailors. They made clothes for the ready-made dealers. The competition was keen. In order to beat the system, one tailor hired Italians. Finally the Swedes were driven out.

"The Italians are very thrifty and they began buying the property. By a miracle, it often seemed to me, they would pay off the mortgages.

"Then came along the 'Black Hand.' They went after everyone who owned property, until the Italians are now trying to sell. I sold a place at $9,500 on May 4. The purchaser paid $4,000 in cash. On May 19 he got his first 'black hand' letter demanding money. Others followed. He wanted me to take the property back. He has since moved away and I don't know where he lives."

A summary of the operation and effect of the "black hand" in Chicago was given in a statement by Rocco de Stefano, the attorney for James
Illinois Crime Survey

Colosimo, after the latter was murdered. He said that the “black hand” in Chicago:

“(1) Terrifies Italians so that none dare testify;
“(2) Keeps Italians from buying property lest they be suspected of having money and thus be ‘black handed’;
“(3) Causes banks to refuse loans on property in the Italian district;
“(4) Kidnaps judges of election and through terror prevents identification of kidnappers;
“(5) Kidnaps young girls and forces them into marriage with young gangsters—then coerces the girl’s parents to support the unwilling bride and her gangster husband.”

5. Same: The Trials of the “Black Hand” Cases.

A month after the conviction of Geraci, July 30, 1909, in the case prosecuted by Malato, a young Sicilian was arrested as a suspect in a plot to extort four thousand dollars from Joseph Macaluso, a steamship agent living at 382 Clark Street, whose home had been bombed on April 12, 1909. Carlini was acquitted by a jury on account of insufficient evidence on the charges of extortion and bomb-throwing. He maintained that he was a mere mediator between the “Black Hand” and the victim.

About the same time the case of Joseph Bertucci, a “black hand” murderer, came to trial (June 22, 1909). Bruno Nordi, indicted with Bertucci, was on the witness stand about to testify against his co-defendant. A stranger entered the court room, waved a red handkerchief at the witness and fled. Detectives Longebardi and Bernacchi were dispatched after the stranger, but no trace of him could be found. Nordi refused to answer any questions asked by the prosecutor. Nordi’s wife also refused to testify, and the trial was adjourned. He claimed that he was afraid he would be killed if he testified, and it was assumed that he was threatened by the man who signaled with his handkerchief. The detectives were unable to apprehend the mysterious person who fled from the court room.

In the Cinene killing, January 8, 1910, silence ruled the tongues of witnesses and relatives who were in a position to know the murderers and the motive of the killing. According to one sergeant attached to the Chicago Avenue Station, “All the reply I could get was ‘Me don’t know.’” A son-in-law of the victim shrugged his shoulders and replied negatively to all questions put to him by the police. The sergeant remarked:

“These people won’t bring the police any information. They say, ‘What’s the use? It won’t bring the dead man to life.’ It is safe to say, however, that within three months there will be another killing and the dead man will be one of the three assassins of Cinene.”

As early as November, 1909, the police department, in an effort to get at the instigators of bombing plots, met a stone wall of silence when searching for information which would lead to the bombers. The victims refused to identify or give any details of an affair which took place before their eyes, so great was the fear of the law-abiding element of Italians.

1 Record Herald, January 8, 1910.
Terrorization by Bombs


The paying of tribute was probably wide-spread and the instances of Italians who persistently refused fairly rare. Joseph Phillipelli was one who refused the demands of extortioners and he was killed on April 12, 1909. Though fatally wounded, he managed to hold one of his assailants until police arrived. The captive gave his name as Tony Baffa. During the same evening, James Arrigo, a wholesale fruit dealer, was the target of gun-fire while in his home at 100 Larrabee Street. Tony Baffa, the captive, was an Italian boy, eighteen years of age, who had lived in America only about three years. Three months after the killing of Phillipelli he confessed and described the organization and activities of a little "Black Hand" ring. Its name was ironically "Lo Giusto," translation of which is "The Just." He gave the names of five members—Antonio, Rafaelo and Pasquale Nudo, and Giuseppe and Ernesto Caro. After he had received a threat, Phillipelli followed the practice of never stepping out of his house without carrying his infant child in his arms as protection, knowing that the "Black Handers" would not fire at it. The five waited for three months and then decided to do away with him in spite of the child in his arms. They sent Baffo to kill him and promised him money, counsel and other aid. Due, however, to the activities of Detective Longobardi, these friends, in fear of arrest, stayed away from the county jail. This apparent neglect induced Baffo to confess. His confederates were arrested, fingerprinted and measured, but were never prosecuted.

Detective Longobardi and his partner, Bernacchi, because of their energetic pursuit of "Black Handers," were waylaid and slashed on the wrists while warding off a stiletto attack. This occurred (March, 1910) while the entire press of the nation was concentrated upon the death of Petrosino, the detective of international fame who went to Italy to study the Camorra and was killed there. His death established the conclusion that the Camorra was international.

Following a general denunciation of the Italians, in March, 1910, Attorney John DeGrazia rose in defense of Chicago Italians and berated the Chicago newspapers for bringing into disrepute the whole Italian populace because a few acts of violence had occurred in Italian areas. He also alleged that blackmailing was more prevalent among other nationalities, and in addition stated that it had never been shown that there existed any such criminal organization, composed exclusively of Italians, as the newspapers alleged with such certainty. This is similar to a declaration made by Guido Sabetta, Italian Consul in Chicago, who stated several years ago:

"There is no such thing as a 'black hand' organization. I was for some time stationed in the Sicilian district of my country, in the locality most often accused of harboring 'black hand' organizations. I never heard of such a body there."

This particular form of defense, made by Italian popular leaders, recurs whenever there is a great public stir about murders among Italians. It is, of course, untrue that Italians are all "Black Handers." By and large, the

\[1 \text{Record Herald, March 26, 1910.} \]

943
community was victimized. The accusations against the whole group bring out these defenders who rise to leadership when they decry the persecution of the group.

7. *Same: The Futile Raid.* Throughout 1909 there were several bombings which did not come to the point of arrest and trial. In January, 1910, after great public criticism, the police made a spectacular raid in Little Italy, arresting one hundred ninety-four Sicilians. This sudden raid was the result of the mysterious death of Veneditto Cinene, sixty years old, who was shot while in bed at his home at 500 Oak Street. The neighborhood believed that Cinene was a police stool-pigeon. The entire number arrested were taken in five saloons around Oak and Milton streets. Cinene’s own son was serving a twenty-five year sentence for burglary, in which he had attempted to kill a policeman. Within twelve hours all of the 194 were released. The raid was a failure. The police did not succeed in establishing a connection of any of those arrested with any current crime. Saloon-keepers and “ward-heelers” were the only ones who profited in money and popularity by securing the releases.

Two days after the assassination of Cinene one of his neighbors, Mr. Joseph Noto, received threats, and a week later a grocer at Halsted and Grand Avenue received a threatening letter. In a carefully laid plot one of the extortioners, Cristino Moffor, nineteen, was caught. He named Gustantino Lonero as a partner. Nothing more came of this arrest.

A month later the explosion of a bomb at the grocery store of Mr. G. Biumeforddo, at 903 Gault Court, upon his refusal to pay tribute, caused renewed activity by the police with raids and prompt discharges. Detectives Patrick Quinn and John A. Wren, of the Chicago Avenue Station, were the target of a shooting, for which Caramello Morici and Tony Morici were held as assailants. They were supposed “Black Handers.” Nothing came of this case.

Two weeks later four Italians were arrested as the alleged ringleaders of the “Black Hand” organization which had been in existence for twenty years. They were charged with extorting fifteen thousand dollars from south side Italians. They gave their names as Charles Morstazzee, 45 years; William Lorengoni, 48 years; John Morissi, 62 years; and R. Romacetti, 20 years. All gave bond and promptly disappeared.

In April, 1910, two more killings occurred in Gault Court.

8. *Same: The Purchase of Paroles.* On the heels of these continued failures to carry prosecution to a conviction and the general knowledge that even the White Hand Society had practically given up because of threats, came the information that large sums of “Black Hand” money had been used to procure the release on parole of three of five extortionists sent to Joliet Penitentiary. They were released at the end of eleven months’ service. Dr. C. Voleni, former president of the White Hand Society, said that the men had been provided with immense sums of money, which was spent like water by the lawyers and conspirators, with the result that no “Black Hand” men, convicted by the White Hand Organization, remained behind the bars long.

*Dr. Joseph Damiani, the president of the White Hand Society, said*
Terrorization by Bombs

that the members were so discouraged by the lax administration of justice that they were refusing to advance further money to prosecute men arrested on their complaints. He declared that the few witnesses who risked their lives by testifying were now at the mercy of the "Black Handers." Both the paroled men and the erstwhile prosecuting witnesses now lived in the congested tenement district on the north side, known to the police as "Little Hell."

An editorial in the Chicago Record Herald commented upon the statement of the officers of the White Hand Society on March 20, 1911, as follows:

"It is doubtless true, as prominent members of the White Hand Society say, that our uncertain, slow and clumsy machinery of justice—including pardons—is in some degree responsible for the audacity of the brigands who are terrorizing law-abiding Italians. To see criminals convicted of murderous conspiracies and released after a few months at the instance of mysterious influences is hardly to conceive a wholesome respect for law and order."

"Still, it must be recognized that the police, the prosecuting officials and even the courts, face a most difficult situation in dealing with imported species of crimes committed by recent arrivals in alien colonies, that are isolated by mental and physical habits from the American community. To suppress crime effectively you must understand its psychology and pathology and its environment. The difficulties of the police in detecting and comprehending Italian criminals may be illustrated by an actual instance. A murder was committed here in Chicago and the detectives, native and Italian, were set to work on the case. They succeeded in learning who the murderer was, but in spite of nets and traps, weeks passed in a vain hunt for him. Finally an Italian detective saw the 'wanted man' leave the home of the brother of the murdered man. That home had been the criminal's refuge for weeks. When the police summoned the brother to explain the strange affair he declared that the murderer had been wounded and that he and his family had shielded and nursed the wretch back to life in order to 'kill him' and thus duly and personally avenge the death of the beloved brother.

"This sort of story would astonish one in a melodrama; what are practical policemen in real life to make of it? How could it have occurred to them to look for the criminal in the home of the victim's own devoted brother?"

"Thus alien ways, alien notions, alien psychology of crime, punishment and revenge, complicate terribly the situation created by the lawless Italian bands."

Threats, tributes and vengeance continued. Paul Figaro's dry goods store at 1025 Larrabee Street was bombed within two hours after the time he had been instructed to deposit three thousand dollars at a designated place. It was the second bombing in five months.

Carmello Marsala's butcher shop was bombed and nine persons injured, at 834 Gault Court on January 19, 1911. The police made an arrest at this time and announced that they had rooted out the extortioners. Gianni

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1 Record Herald, March 18, 1911.
Illinois Crime Survey

Alonzi was convicted, but bombs continued. Artizo Stoa's drug store at 1001 Larrabee Street was shattered by a bomb immediately after this announcement.

Anthony Dugo and Phillippi Maniscalco were killed on March 14, 1911. A suspect was arrested a week later, but nothing came of it. Another killing at "death corner," Oak and Milton streets, added to the swollen lists of marked men. Tony Gathios of 1008 Gault Court was the last of four victims in one week, killed by a mysterious assailant called the "black hand."

The most probable reason for the disappearance of the modus operandi designated as "black hand," is due to the fact that in using the mails, extortioners lay themselves liable to prosecution by the Federal Government.

On September 1, 1910, Grouchicha Battaglia was sentenced to Leavenworth for four years and four months.

Nicholas Carrozso, Frank Cozza and Tony Paul were arrested after Carrozso received marked bills used as a trap, from Dominico Jagulli, 813 South Clinton Street, on February 17, 1913.

On May 27, 1915, two men who threatened Antonio Petrone, 1507 West Ohio Avenue, were caught after picking up the package containing the marked bills. One of them confessed he wanted the money badly to go back to Italy. This was probably only an alibi in order to shield the real bosses of the gang.

On June 2, 1915, Luigi Anello was arrested after he received from Jacomo Monichino $250 in person. On Anello's person was found an unmailed letter addressed to Monichino. He was arrested by Sergeants Gentile and Polcaster.

On June 7, 1915, federal authorities arrested Paul and Pietro Mennite. They were assisted by Antonio Petrone, 1407 West Ohio Street, who a month before also helped in the arrest of two other "black handers."

On April 13, 1919, two Italians, who gave as their names Joseph Anzalone, 517 West Oak Street, and Dominic Catalina, 508 Hobbie Street, were arrested by police after they procured ten revolvers in a hardware store of Bullard and Gormley. Lieutenant Michael Hughes announced that he expected to link the murder of Nicholas Cinffo, 2227 Bissell Street, on December 19, 1918, with these men.

On April 16, 1919, Frank Cutsia and James Scardina were arrested and held on five thousand dollar bonds, for charges of blowing up the home of Andrea Russo, and for writing a letter demanding fifty thousand dollars. Handwriting experts claim that the letter was written by one of them.

The method used in capturing the extortionists was to follow the instructions in the letter received. Usually the men marked the bills placed in the envelope, box or package, as directed in the letters. Then the victim went to the spot indicated in the letter while a group of hidden detectives surrounded that spot. When the extortionists came along to take the package, they were seized. This trap succeeded in many instances in Chicago.

About the same time inspectors of the post office discovered "Black Hand" operations among other than Italians, as, for instance, the case of two wealthy Syrian rug dealers, who were victimized by Dr. Alfred Gelbert.
Terrorization by Bombs

Judge K. M. Landis, on April 21, 1911, gave Alongi the maximum sentence, five years in the Leavenworth Penitentiary and $1,000 fine, for writing threatening letters to Marsala demanding five hundred dollars on the penalty of losing his life, after which a bomb explosion occurred at Marsala's home on January 18, 1911. The judge imposed the penalty only for the use of the mails. He had no jurisdiction over the bombing. In the course of this trial Judge Landis received many threats. In February of the following year (1912) the same judge sentenced Salvatore Scassia to four years in Leavenworth Penitentiary for sending "black hand" letters. Scassia pleaded guilty in an attempted extortion of two hundred dollars.

The next case of a "black hand" clique was rounded up by the Chief of Postal Inspectors Germer, in June, 1923. Mr. Germer effected the capture of the clique through a letter received by Giorgio Arquilla, 8348 Cottage Grove Avenue, which demanded ten thousand dollars.

10. Same: Bombing as an Organized Crime.

That the making of bombs is not an unskilled business, though extortion is occasionally the work of an individual unskilled in the preparation of bombs, was demonstrated in a raid made by Riccio Bernardi, Longobardi and De Vito, on what they called the "Clearing-house of Black Handers," at a grocery store at 908 Sholto Street. Anthony Loungara, proprietor, and another were arrested. With them were seized bombs, dynamite fuses, percussion caps, and other explosives. The most important discovery was the list of one hundred fifty names of persons who, it was alleged, had contributed sums to a fund to be used in the defense of Joseph and Carmelo Nicolo, then on trial in Judge Honore's Court, charged with kidnapping Angelo Marena from his parents at 852 Gault Court.

11. Same: Summary of Conclusions.

1. "Black Hand" is extortion, using the anonymous threatening letter. It existed and exists in Sicily. The victims, in fear of death, refuse to talk or aid the police in prosecution.
2. The law-abiding Italians are convinced, through experience, of the futility and danger of giving the police information. Year after year they have witnessed the failure of justice in prosecution and the visitation of vengeance upon those who aid the law.
3. The conspirators are often powerfully connected politically or can use bribery, can "fix" juries and officials, and can intimidate witnesses.
4. In the Federal Courts the jurisdiction is limited to penalties for the use of mails for the purpose of extortion. Since Judge Landis convicted a number of "black handers" who were effectively prosecuted, the practice of extortion by mail has ceased and little more is heard of "black hand," but extortion by violence or gun and the bomb has not ceased.
5. It is the purest banality to excuse the nefarious, bloody practices and wide-spread tribute paid by the victims, by the historical explanation that blackmail and the conspiracy of silence are old-world traits transplanted. These practices originated in Sicily under conditions which were very similar.

1 Tribune, October 11, 1911.
in the cardinal features to the conditions which the Italian found under John Powers and other politicians who would go to any length to paralyze the law and secure the release of any criminal for money or political following. In Sicily, too, the Mafia controlled elections, and the law was so ineffectual against the operations of the society that the people dared not trust themselves to its protection, but suffered in silence, no matter how heavy the burden that was thrust upon them. Should a Mafia member commit a murder and be arrested, it was the duty of its politicians to bribe the jury or overawe it to find a favorable verdict. A prosecuting witness suffered loss in property or his life was taken. This was the condition described in the literature about Sicily at the period when the immigration to America began and while it was at its height. In some American cities where the law is effectual, the “black handers” have ceased to operate. We use the word “Mafia” here, because the “black hand” modus operandi was also used by it in Sicily.

Extortionist methods may spread throughout a society.

“In the cities the Mafia is so conducted that its members can live well without working. It has developed blackmailing almost to the degree of an art. It draws a profit from every trade in which a Sicilian is interested. At an auction sale, even the intending purchaser is informed by a significant looking man that someone else wants the property, but if he will pay a certain price in the interests of the poor he can have it. He must buy off the Mafia.”

In Chicago there has developed a pattern like the Mafia among groups, such as “Racketeer” organizations and trade associations, which did not import the pattern as an old-world trait. Not only has the extortionist thrived among Italians in Chicago, but other national groups to whom violence was very foreign have developed methods of extortion. What conditions in Chicago have favored the rise, spread and persistence of extortions by violence as an aspect of organized crime?


John Powers, alderman, had been the ruler of the old Nineteenth Ward since 1888. He began his political career with a constituency predominately Irish, but the invasion of the Italians continued until they held the majority of votes in the ward in 1916, when Anthony D’Andrea made his first real public appearance. The Italians were becoming conscious that the time was ripe for one of their own national origin to become alderman.

An intermediate stage in this conflict of racial or national succession is one of conflict among factions of the invaders, divided between those who have joined their interests with the established group that preceded them in the area and those who are for succession of the invading group, now grown sufficiently large and powerful to dominate.

D’Andrea was the candidate who opposed James Bowler, the junior alderman and tool of Powers, for the Democratic nomination for alderman in February, 1916. Two years before, he had sought the office of County

1 Record Herald, September 15, 1912.
Terrorization by Bombs

Commissioner, as a Democrat, but was defeated. During the campaign the fact emerged that D’Andrea had served a term in the penitentiary for counterfeiting. He had been pardoned by President Roosevelt through the influence of a former pupil whom he had instructed in foreign languages, for D’Andrea was a linguist and had studied for the priesthood in Palermo, Sicily. Because of this conviction his opponents tried to induce the Election Board to have his name removed from the ballot; but the board held that it was not within its province, that such action could only be taken through a quo warranto proceeding after election or by an injunction proceeding to restrain the board from placing the candidate’s name on the ballot. D’Andrea, to prove his own stable status and to contradict the defamatory charges made against him, said: “I have been, since the pardon, the president of one of the largest Italian societies of Chicago, and three or four years ago was elected president of the Italian Colonial Committee of the Italian Societies of Chicago, and am now enjoying the proud distinction of being president of the International Hod Carriers’ Union.”

On February 21, 1916, Frank Lombardi, a political leader in the Nineteenth Ward, who was active in his opposition to D’Andrea, was shot dead in a saloon at 1120 Taylor Street. Lombardi’s daughter maintained that her father was killed because he had dared to head a determined fight against D’Andrea, “who had long lorded it over a fear stricken ward, too afraid of his power to cross him.” The newspapers were favorable to the theory that it was D’Andrea’s political faction that was responsible for the murder.\(^1\)

The above account of the killing of Lombardi furnishes an early instance of the weapon of homicide in political wars. This method of intimidation was used by an organization sponsoring an Italian candidate in a community predominantly Italian, against a man who had built a strong machine by corruption, intimidation, and apparent generosity. Neither of the assailants was apprehended and so never prosecuted.

D’Andrea was unsuccessful in this campaign; Bowler backed by Powers and his machine was too powerful to be beaten by an organization so recently developed. Between this defeat and the next campaign, D’Andrea added to his labor dominion by becoming business agent for the Macaroni Manufacturers’ Union and interested in the management of the unions of Sewer Diggers, Tunnel Workers, and Water Pipe Extension Laborers.

In October, 1919, D’Andrea ran for the Democratic nomination for representative in the Constitutional Convention from the Democratic Second District, against Senator Francis A. Hurley. A dispute arose over the tally of a precinct in the Nineteenth Ward, and after listening to the evidence,\(^1\)

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1. The Chicago Daily Tribune commented upon D’Andrea’s record as follows:
   “Anthony D’Andrea is the same Antonio D’Andrea, unfrocked priest, linguist, and former power in the old ‘red-light’ district, who in April, 1903, was released from the penitentiary after serving thirteen months on a counterfeit charge.
   “D’Andrea’s name has also been connected with a gang of Italian forgers and bank thieves who operated at one time all over the country. At the time of his arrest and conviction, D’Andrea’s brother, Joseph D’Andrea, was president of the Sewer and Tunnel Miners’ Union. Joseph D’Andrea, a labor leader who was accused of having introduced the pon system of extorting money from Italian laborers, was shot and killed a few years ago in a labor quarrel over the construction of the new Union Station in Canal Street. Antonio D’Andrea succeeded his brother as head of the union.”

949
Illinois Crime Survey

Judge Pinkney ordered the vote of this precinct disregarded, which gave the election to Hurley. The Citizens’ Association had started an inquiry and brought in fifty-six voters whose names appeared on the poll lists as having voted and who swore that they had not gone to the polls. Their names had been voted for them.

D’Andrea was then elected president of the Unione Siciliana, one of the strongest organizations of foreign groups in America.

In March, 1920, Powers was offered the committeeanship of the Nineteenth Ward. In a speech declining the office he urged the ward organization to give its support to Anthony D’Andrea, his one-time political opponent for the office. Powers, himself, emphasized the overwhelming Italian population in the ward, which was then about eighty per cent of the total, as the reason for an Italian for ward committeeman. It was a bid for the support of D’Andrea by peaceful means and is ample proof that Powers valued D’Andrea’s support and appreciated his strength. The Supreme Court of Illinois made void the election for committeeman, therefore D’Andrea did not long retain the ward committeeanship and Powers regained it.

On September 28, 1920, a bomb was exploded on the front porch of Alderman’s Powers’ former actual, now official, residence at 1284 McAllister Place.

After the primaries D’Andrea announced his non-partisan candidacy for alderman of the Nineteenth Ward, to oppose John Powers. The election, which took place on February 22, 1921, was preceded by numerous bombings and killings. D’Andrea had gained enormous strength and Powers had reason to fear his activities. D’Andrea had worked himself into the labor unions, was the leader of the Italian organizations, had contributed substantially to the election campaign fund the prior November, and, probably as a result, had been given the privilege of selecting the Democratic clerks and judges of election—a concession formerly held by Powers.

On February 7, 1921, a bomb was placed in a meeting hall at 854 Blue Island Avenue, while a meeting was in progress in the interests of D’Andrea. Five of the three hundred persons who had crowded into the hall were severely injured.

D’Andrea immediately attributed the bombing to politicians. Powers stated, that, as far as he knew, politics had nothing to do with the affair. He said: “Why only last Saturday D’Andrea and I sat down together for two hours in the Sherman House and agreed to conduct a clean-cut campaign. There was to be absolutely no mud-slinging and no gunmen on election day or any other time. We shook hands and parted the best of friends.”

As in the case of the recent bombings in 1928 of the homes of United States Senator Charles S. Deneen and Judge John A. Swanson, candidate against Robert E. Crowe in the primaries of April, 1928, the Crowe interests claimed that the Deneenites had bombed themselves, so Alderman John B. Bowler claimed that the bombing of the D’Andrea meeting was executed by D’Andrea interests in order to discredit Alderman Powers. He said: “Alderman Powers’ political opponents knew that we were sending a letter
Terrorization by Bombs

through the ward today referring to the recent bomb outrage at his home, 1284 McAllister Place, and executed the bomb outrage last night to offset the effect of that letter." Alderman Bowler also charged that imported gunmen were conducting a systematic campaign of terrorism throughout the Nineteenth Ward; that lives of city officials had been threatened; that political and labor workers had been repeatedly slugged; that attempts to hold meetings had caused the terrorization of owners of halls; and that certain private homes had been guarded day and night to prevent their destruction by explosion. He added:

"Conditions in the Nineteenth Ward are terrible. Gunmen are patrolling the streets. I have received threats that I was to be 'bumped off' or kidnapped. Alderman Powers' house is guarded day and night. Our men have been met, threatened and slugged. Gunmen and cutthroats have been imported from New York and Buffalo for this campaign of intimidation. Alderman Powers' forces can't hold meetings except under heavy guard. Owners of halls have been threatened with death or the destruction of their buildings if they rent their places to us. It is worse than the middle ages."

On February 18, 1921, the home of Joseph Spica, 1028 Newberry Avenue, was bombed. His son-in-law, who was living with him, was a political lieutenant of D'Andrea. Later in the campaign a bomb was set off to destroy the headquarters of the D'Andrea faction. Just as in 1928, the reward gesture followed. Powers offered a two thousand dollar reward for the arrest of the bombers. No such reward has ever been collected.

Powers defeated D'Andrea by 435 votes and there were charges and counter-charges of stealing votes. A hearing before County Judge Frank Righeimer settled the matter in favor of the incumbent, John Powers.

This was not the end of violence. Old accounts had to be settled. On March 9, 1921, Paul Labriola, Municipal Court Deputy Bailiff and loyal supporter of John Powers, was shot at West Congress and Halsted Streets. A short time later Harry Raimondi, another faithful adherent of Powers, was given the same treatment. D'Andrea denied complicity in the deaths, although some of his associates in the D'Andrea organization were held as suspects by the police. Samuel (Samuzzo) Amatuna first came into print as a suspect for these two killings. He was killed five years later, after he had risen to leadership of the bootleg interests, while trying to rally the disorganized forces of the Genna gang, depleted by murder after murder. Frank Gambino (Don Chick) was indicted with him, as well as Angelo Genna. The latter was actually tried for these two murders and was acquitted. The D'Andrea-Labriola-Raimondi incident caused Chief of Police Fitzmorris to issue a sweeping combination transfer and suspension order, which moved seven hundred twelve members of the police department around on the city's checkerboard, and changed the entire personnel of the police of the Nineteenth Ward.

The "bloody Nineteenth" continued to be an armed camp, despite the changes in police administration. D'Andrea and his supporters were receiving warnings and threats over the telephone. Police cars were stationed at their homes. Squads from the Detective Bureau made wholesale raids on
Illinois Crime Survey

henchmen of both Powers and D’Andrea. A week after the funeral of Labriola and Raimondi, D’Andrea announced that he had decided to sever his connections with Nineteenth Ward politics, but the war continued. Two stolen autos with armed men toured the ward one day, creating terrorism. The gang in one of the autos peppered a crowd gathered in front of a poolroom, with slugs from a sawed-off shotgun. Adherents of the D’Andrea faction seemed to be the targets of the invaders. A shooting affray in a grocery store at 1029 South Newberry Avenue, owned by friends of Powers, occurred a week later.

On May 11, 1921, the climax of the political war was reached when D’Andrea was made the target of a sawed-off shotgun. Police immediately expressed the belief that D’Andrea was shot by political terrorists in revenge for the deaths of Paul Labriola and Harry Raimondi, adherents of Alderman Powers. Threatening letters forecasting D’Andrea’s assassination were found. They were received by a tenant living in the same building with the D’Andrea family. One letter read:

“He killed others. We are going to do the same.”

(Signed) “Revenge.”

Another:

“You are to move in fifteen days. We are going to blow the building up and kill the whole D’Andrea family. He killed others and we are going to do the same thing. We mean business. You’d better move and save many lives.”

When the recipient showed these letters to the police, prior to the killing of D’Andrea, they looked upon them as practical jokes and refused to take any action.

Stephen Malato, after a talk with D’Andrea on his deathbed, said: “From my little talk with D’Andrea I am satisfied he was shot by expert killers. I wouldn’t say they were imported. It wasn’t their first job of the kind.”

William Navigato, former member of the legislature and personal friend of D’Andrea, was convinced that the assailants were imported gunmen. He also said, “If they find the men who tried to murder D’Andrea, they may find the same paid gunmen who murdered Jim Colosimo.”

Powers, naturally, attributed D’Andrea’s death to labor troubles, but the explanation was a defensive one. The definitely known partisanship and position of the victims before and after the D’Andrea killing and their activity in politics would determine beyond a doubt that this was a political war—a feud which was an outgrowth of Powers’ tactics in seeking to hold a ward which had become an Italian constituency and demanded Italian succession to political office.

The funeral of D’Andrea was suitable for royalty. Like Colosimo's, a great many public officials were honorary pall-bearers. He was refused services in the cathedral, but his own brother, a priest, was allowed to officiate.

Coroner Peter M. Hoffman opened the inquest over the body of Anthony D’Andrea before a jury which he believed to be threat-proof, but, after several continuances, the usual verdict was returned—with due sol-
Terrorization by Bombs

...enmity it was recommended that the murderer, or murderers, be apprehended and held to the grand jury. One and one-half columns of space were devoted to the impaneling of the jury and what it expected to do. One-eighth of a column was all the space given to the feeble results of the investigation.

The climax of the Nineteenth Ward political feud had been reached in the slaying of D'Andrea. He was one of the two central figures in the war. However, the feud remained to be fully evolved. The killing of three followers of D'Andrea provided the denouement of this story.

"The strongest theory for the killing of Laspisa was the knowledge he had of the killers of D'Andrea. He had taken D'Andrea home in his car the night the latter was killed; the assailants were provoked to silencing him forever."

On July 22, 1921, Andrew Orlando, another friend of D'Andrea, was killed, and on August 15, 1921, Joseph Sinacola was killed in the presence of his two children, in front of his home at 725 South Loomis Street. It was then learned that Sinacola and Laspisa together had sworn to avenge the death of D'Andrea.

The Powers-D'Andrea political feud is given as an example of political bombing. It is not to be assumed that a full account has been given of every death or attempted homicide in this struggle, but here have been traced the principal actors and victims in this tragic political war.

13. Same: Race Rivalry and Political Succession.

The bombing war in the political struggle of the Nineteenth Ward is symptomatic of the invasion of a racial group into the geographic territory of another and its efforts at self-determination and succession to political power. Long after the ward was overwhelmingly Italian, the Irish leader of the preceding group tried to retain the political power, while the Italian group fought for succession. It is true that D'Andrea used the same methods as Powers, but it is also true that only a D'Andrea, willing to use force without stint or limit, could rise to leadership in the situation against the use of fraud, the connivance and protection of politics, and the highly developed qualities of "ward healer" leadership which John Powers possessed along with the availability of protected, armed partisans. We use the term "the struggle for self-determination"—it was nothing short of that. That is why the Italians made D'Andrea a national-group hero, as manifested in his royal funeral.

Bombing is not, however, always associated with political emancipation of an insurgent immigrant group. In Milwaukee, the Italians, coming from the same villages and provinces and settling in similar proportion in an area near freight depots, displaced the Irish who were their predecessors as railroad workers. An Irishman had been alderman from this ward for about as long a period as John Powers. In contrast to Powers, this alderman gained the reputation of "watchdog of the city treasury"; he became presi-

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1 Tribune, June 25, 1921.
2 In an unpublished manuscript, filed in the Chicago Evening American reference room, many more names and incidents can be found.
Illinois Crime Survey

dent of the City Council many years ago and has remained in this office continuously. There, too, the Italians have asserted themselves and have been rising in public service and in business. Their alderman helped them rise. He fought for good streets and excellent school facilities, combined with a social center building and natatorium in his ward. Political violence, fraud and connivance have never been employed and the leadership of the Italians has been subject to other conditions of natural selection. Therefore, at present, the Italian leaders are of a superior type there.

14. Political Bombing and a Popular Uprising. Bombs, transcending the limited area of politics in a foreign neighborhood, became the deciding element in the memorable primary election of April 10, 1928.

Judge John A. Swanson, candidate of the Deneen faction for the office of state’s attorney, began early in the campaign to demand an explanation for bombings at the homes of Fitzmorris, a member of Mayor Thompson’s cabinet; of Dr. Reid, supporter and close friend of Thompson; of the undertaking establishment of Judge Sbarboro, an administration leader; and at the home of Cuneo, brother-in-law to Robert E. Crowe as well as his secretary. This demand brought the issue of the use of the bomb in organized gambling and in the inter-organization of the gambling ring with politics to the center of public attention.

Beginning with a flimsy organization, the Deneen faction was fighting the greatest machine the city had ever seen, controlling, through the alliance of Thompson, Crowe and Small, practically all the state, county and city offices with their jobs and patronage.

In the death, in the midst of the campaign, of Joseph F. Haas, county recorder, a powerful member of the Deneen faction, who was a candidate for renomination, the Deneen forces suffered a disaster. This office controlled about six hundred jobs and was the mainstay of Deneen patronage. A struggle between the factions followed for the filling of the unexpired term and the candidacy for the vacancy. County Judge Jarecki wanted to appoint Harry E. Hoff, brother-in-law of Haas, but the Crowe-Thompson machine, greedy for this plum, had control of the County Board. At first Joseph P. Savage was suggested for the office; then the attempt was made to appoint John Jarawowski, county commissioner, the Crowe candidate for the office; and failing in this because of a law prohibiting it, Mrs. Jarawowski was chosen to fill the unexpired term.

The Deneenites, frantic over their loss, issued a call for Senator Deneen to return from Washington to lead the campaign.

The assassination of Joseph Esposito (Diamond Joe) on the night of March 21, 1928, was the second disaster of the campaign. Esposito had been a staunch friend and supporter of Senator Deneen. While he was a master in the political methods of the Italian ward, he was at the same time a beloved leader, a charitable compatriot, loyal to his family, his church, and his friends. In a previous primary he was the only Deneen candidate to be elected ward committeeman in the entire city.

The Crowe-Thompson faction, through the office of the state’s attorney and the chief of police, attempted to give a sinister significance to the per-
Terrorization by Bombs

sonal relations of Diamond Joe by publishing clues which would involve him as a protector of bootleggers. These clues served as a means of temporary confusion, but they proved futile and the fact remained that he was the opponent of Joseph P. Savage, favorite of Crowe for the ward committee-manship, and that he was assassinated after the time limit for the filing of another candidacy in opposition to Savage had expired.

At the solemn high mass in the very large Catholic church at Roosevelt and Blue Island, the edifice and the streets around it for blocks were filled to overflowing with mourners standing in rain and sleet. Father Breen intoned the sentiment of the mourners when he said:

"The dastardly deed, for which Chicago is known, has again been committed. This is no place for hate—only for love. But four million educated people will rise in their wrath to protest against this condition."

The morning after the Esposito funeral, the nerves of Chicagoans were again unstrung by the news of the bombings, twenty-eight minutes apart, of the homes of both Senator Deneen and Judge Swanson. These bombings could have no other but political implications and all factions agreed on that. The Crowe-Thompson faction made the classic blunder of Chicago politics when, after these bombings, true to the usual pattern in the bombings of ward politics, Mr. Crowe issued the following statement on March 27, 1928:

"I am satisfied that the bombings were done by leaders in the Deneen forces and by the same people responsible for the bombings of the homes of the Rev. Elmer L. Williams and Czarnecki, and were done mainly to discredit Mayor Thompson and myself. They realize that they are hopelessly defeated and in a desperate attempt to overcome their tide of defeat they are resorting to these dangerous tactics."

A similar public statement was made by Thompson. Arthur Evans in the Chicago Tribune commented thus:

"The callous, cynical note in this led to public exasperation. The ordinary citizen, his sympathies excited by the bomb, was incensed to read in an adjoining column the claims of the Thompsonites that the Deneenites had perpetrated the outrages themselves."

Again, true to the pattern of violence in ward politics, Crowe offered the same type of futile reward which throughout the history of bombing in Chicago has never been collected—ten thousand dollars for the discovery of the bombers. The reward mounted to sixty-five thousand dollars when Thompson and his cabinet added five thousand dollars a-piece.

On April 6, the Chicago Crime Commission, which had been friendly to Crowe, issued an open letter to Crowe, as follows:

"TO THE VOTERS OF COOK COUNTY:

"The Chicago Crime Commission, believing that State's Attorney Crowe is inefficient and unworthy of his great responsibility to maintain law and order in Cook County, and that his alliances are such as to destroy public confidence in his integrity, recommends to the citizens that he be defeated for renomination."

The news of these political outrages gained national and international
Illinois Crime Survey

momentum and the Chicago press published world-wide comment derogatory to Chicago. The police and the prosecutor admitted their failure to discover the bombers after the early clues dwindled. The bombings transcended all other issues in the public mind—the traction bill, the seventy-eight million dollar bond issue included—and "Pineapples and Plunder" had become the basis of the campaigning. It was "pineapples" that turned the campaign. In the election the Deneen faction, almost without an organization, achieved an overwhelming victory over the most powerful machine Chicago ever had. It was purely a revolt, an uprising of the people, expressing themselves through the ballot. The birth of "Moral Chicago" was hailed throughout the world.

The Twentieth Ward, long famous as a hotbed of crooked politics, contributed the most startling item of post-election news. Morris Eller, the recognized leader of the ward and candidate for sanitary trustee and ward committeeman under the Thompson-Crowe banner, was opposed for the first time by a colored resident of the ward for the position of ward committeeman. Attorney Octavius Granady, the Deneen candidate who had the temerity to question the absolute rule of Eller, went down under a shower of lead after the polls had closed on April 10. The ward is in the state of becoming predominantly Negro. Granady was the first colored man to come before the colored residents of his ward with a plea for political equality. He was the first casualty in the war for racial succession.

Immediately after the election Judge Daniel Trude, in co-operation with the Cook County Bar Association (the colored lawyers' bar) was busy getting statements from witnesses who had seen the killing. Acting on the information thus obtained, the Chicago Bar Association launched a drive for the calling of a special grand jury to investigate the vote frauds of the April 10, primary as well as the preceding elections. The Chicago Crime Commission almost simultaneously issued a public statement denouncing affiliations of several of the criminal court judges with crime and politics and, after numerous hearings, with Judges Eller and Klarkowski testifying before a special tribunal composed of fellow members of the bench, the matter of the Granady killing was gone into in detail.

The special grand jury investigation demanded by the bar association, with the attorney-general and his special assistants in charge, was hampered through the refusal of five of the county commissioners, four of whom were political friends of Crowe, to vote funds. Successful efforts were made to raise these funds by voluntary subscription. Five special grand juries were impaneled and a large number of indictments were returned. The interracial bombing war was the result of the same movement of political invasion and succession; but the invaders were more marked by physical characteristics and divided by deeper prejudices than were the Irish and Italians. Between the Irish and Italians there was a deep national and language-group con-

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1. A son of Morris Eller.
2. Morris Eller and his son, Superior Court Judge Emanuel Eller, were indicted by the special grand jury. As this is written their cases are still pending, untried. Morris Eller was defeated for Sanitary District Trustee at the election November 6, 1928, by an overwhelming majority.
Terrorization by Bombs

...sciousness, solidified by the persistent overlordship of Powers and the Irish; between the Negroes and the whites there was the age-long race prejudice which exacerbated the other factors; namely, the traffic in real estate, unionizing of colored labor, unemployment after the war, congestion of population, poor transportation, lack of school facilities, housing and living conditions. "Unquestionably this movement was encouraged by unscrupulous dealers in real estate, both white and colored, who were interested mainly in the profits to be derived."1

Economic losses were suffered by the white people when the invasion of a single Negro family into a white-block depreciated the property value; the white tenants scattered and in time the population of entire blocks changed from white to colored. The recession of the whites lowered the value of the property; the advance of the blacks raised it again to the profit of realtors.

The importation of colored labor from the south, congesting the south side residence district, caused ill feeling and friction. The labor situation was a war condition, taking thousands of young men from the factories and shops for war service. Labor was needed and employers turned to the south as their source of supply. "Nevertheless, it was unfortunate that Negroes in large numbers and unacquainted with northern ways were induced to come or did come to the city of Chicago, without some adequate steps being taken to properly house and care for them."2

The planlessness with which immigration in general has been received in large urban centers may be said to be a fundamental cause of all problems in immigrant areas. The conflict in the stockyards area between the dominant group employed in the packing houses and newcomers who gradually displaced them, is at present shifted to Polish versus Mexican. It was especially dramatized for us on August 9, 1927, when a member of the Stagg gang was killed by a Mexican as an outgrowth of the threats of the Stagg gang to attack all Mexican pool-rooms in the neighborhood of Forty-seventh and Ashland streets.

The migration of the Negro northward during the war affected other cities as well as Chicago; yet in Chicago we have not only these bombing wars to check the geographical extension of the "black belt," but the race riot of 1919. The coroner's jury's report after the riots, which began on July 27, and lasted for five days, states:

"Five days of terrible hate and passion let loose cost the people of Chicago thirty-eight lives (fifteen white and twenty-three colored), wounded and maimed several hundred, destroyed property of untold value, filled thousands with awful fright, blemished the good name of our city, and left in its wake fear and apprehension for the future.

"Race feeling and distrust reaches far back into the history of the past. While new, perhaps, to Chicago, other cities and communities have tasted of its frightfulness, and yet race antagonism in itself rarely gets beyond bound and control. The real danger lies with the criminal and hoodlum element, white and colored, who are quick to take advan-

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1 Coroner's report, 1918-1919.
2 Ibid, page 22.
Illinois Crime Survey

tage of any incipient race riot conditions to spread the firebrands of
disorder, thieving, arson, loss and murder, and under the cover of large
numbers to give full sway to cowardly, animal and criminal instincts."


The grand jury received testimony that race hatred and race rioting was
fostered in social-athletic, political clubs, which were numerous on the
south side and were the rendezvous of the gangsters, protected by their
politician friends.

On April 2, 1920 the Daily News reported that the race crisis in Chi-
cago had become more instead of less critical. Out of a total of one hundred
twenty-two bombings in the city of Chicago between January 21, 1918, and
March 11, 1919, the records of the police show twenty-eight of these bomb-
ings as direct outgrowths of race feeling. In these twenty-eight instances
inquiries by the police revealed the fact that matters connected with real
estate as related to colored people as tenants or owners of property were
the issue which brought about direct action and overt acts. In the following
thirty cases, the bombs were directed against Negroes:

5- 4-1918—4539 Vincennes Avenue, colored families against whose
residence white residents objected.
5-25-1918—4529 Vincennes Avenue, small damage.
9-24-1918—4527 Vincennes Avenue, whites objected to residence
among Negroes.
10- 3-1918—4141 Berkeley Avenue, owned by Jerry Anderson; no
Negroes in vicinity.
3-20-1919—Binga Realty Office, 4724 South State Street; Binga is a
colored banker and community leader. May have been due
to labor trouble because of non-union janitors.
3-20-1919—4041 Calumet Avenue, some damage.
4- 1-1919—J. E. Yarbrough, 4212 Ellis Avenue, owner a colored man
who recently bought property.
4-20-1919—4722 Indiana Avenue, Negro realty office.
5-29-1919—4807 Grand Boulevard, house guarded, bomb thrown on
roof.
5-18-1919—4807 Grand Boulevard, West Harrison, traveling lecturer,
rented property from W. Austin, a white realty man from
the north side.
5-29-1919—4957 Wabash Avenue.
6- 1-1919—W. B. Austin, 103 Bellview Place, window broken. Rented
property at 4807 Grand Boulevard to W. Harrison, a
Negro.
6-13-1919—5006-08 Calumet Avenue.
6-13-1919—5143-45 Prairie Avenue.
12- 4-1919—5922 South Park Avenue, Binga's residence; was offered
thirty thousand dollars for this residence, which he refused.
12- 6-1919—454 East Forty-seventh Street, Hobbs and Grubbs, realty
firm, suspected of renting to colored.
12-12-1919—E. J. Coleman's home, wealthy realty man; sold building to
Negroes. Sister attempted to put out bomb. Seriously
injured.
12-28-1919—4404 Grand Boulevard, Ernest Clark.
Terrorization by Bombs

2-1-1920—103 Bellview Place, W. B. Austin, rented to Negroes.
2-2-1920—4722 Calumet Avenue, doors locked to prevent escape of residents; damage one thousand dollars; Negroes moved in recently.
2-10-1920—3632 Grand Boulevard, Mrs. W. D. O'Brien, sold building to Appomattox Club; windows broken.
2-12-1920—South Hamlin Avenue, Alexander Gibbons, one thousand dollars' damage; said to have sold real estate to Negroes in white localities.
2-12-1920—4406 Grand Boulevard, small damage.
2-16-1920—Binga residence, bomb failed to explode.
3-11-1920—Moses Fox's home, sold property to Negroes; one thousand dollars' damage.
4-27-1920—4331 Vincennes Avenue, Creed Hubbard, five hundred dollars' damage; police say motive was to check steady influx of Negroes into district.
9-16-1920—Powell Wilkinson, 5223 Indiana Avenue, small damage.
10-12-1920—4930 Calumet Avenue, owned by Samuel Lukor, five thousand dollars' damage.
10-16-1920—4119 Lake Park Avenue, attempt to scare away Negro residents; slight damage.
12-10-1920—2601-09 Calumet, sidewalk wrecked, patients in hospital routed. Henry Turner White held by police for discrepancies in his statements.
2-4-1921—423 East Forty-eighth Street, six hurt; policeman fired at fleeing bombers but failed to stop them.
5-7-1921—701 East Fiftieth Street, building recently bought by colored; St. Xavier College girls thrown into a panic.
7-14-1921—423 East Forty-eighth Place, Negro district; Patrol Sergeant James Tucker, a Negro, was hurt.
10-22-1922—1058 W. Fourteenth Street, Isadore Mishelski.
10-27-1922—1135 West Fourteenth Street, pool hall, recently purchased by Negro; bomb prevented from exploding by night watchman.
11-9-1923—3200 Ellis Avenue, former residence of Alderman Oscar DePriest; one thousand dollars' damage.
10-22-1924—4914 Washington Park Court, only Negro in locality; wrecked house of Mrs. Costello, white, also.

Upon plotting on a base map of Chicago each of the above cases of race bombing, it will be seen that twenty-seven out of the total of thirty-eight bombings occurred in the territory bounded by Twenty-sixth Street on the north, Sixtieth Street on the south, Cottage Grove Avenue on the east, and Wentworth Avenue on the west. In terms of percentages, 70 per cent of the cases have been staged within an area of approximately twenty-one square miles. At present the Negro is established in most of this district. The exodus of whites continues as well as the increase of blacks. Within the last three years there has been, practically, peace with occasional local outbursts or individual cases of conflict. The "black belt" has become quite as rigidly a designated area for Negroes as if it had been provided by law. The same segregation occurs in other cities through a process of organization among whites by mutual understanding, and without violence.

959
The background events, conditions and factors in the labor dispute in the building trades resulting in a bombing war beginning in March, 1922, are given by Royal Montgomery, in his "Industrial Relations in the Chicago Building Trades."

"The approximate balance of power maintained between the organized contractors and organized workers from 1911 to 1921 was rudely shattered by the events following the wage arbitration of the latter year, and for a time the dominant force in the Chicago building trades was neither the Building Trades Council nor the Building Construction Employers’ Association, but a ‘Citizens’ Committee’ composed of persons divorced from any direct interest in the construction industry—a sort of Posse Comitatus, as someone has said. A disagreement concerning a proposed reduction of the minimum wage for the skilled trades from $1.25 to $1.00 an hour, and for the unskilled group from $1.00 to 70 cents an hour, was the immediate cause of the conditions between 1921 and 1925, but beneath this surface and immediate cause lay a series of circumstances and a range of practices, some of them having their origins as far back as the beginning of the twentieth century. The Landis arbitration and the events following it should be considered in the light of these background events and conditions.

(1) Building industry stagnant, housing shortage acute, rents advancing, yet promoters unwilling to go ahead with building.

(2) Wage-scale in 1919 20 per cent lower in purchasing power than the 1914 level.

(3) Strikes follow. In 1920 employers granted horizontal wage-scale of $1.25 to skilled trades.

(4) Associated Builders (one employers’ organization) demand a decrease of 25 per cent, ascribing building shortage to high wages. Tumult follows.

(5) The Daily Commission in 1921 gives wide publicity to the combination of materials men, contractors and union leaders as the cause of building shortage.

(6) The general open-shop drive of 1921 and the gains it made when certain unions refused to abide by the terms of the award of 1921.

(7) The 25 per cent reduction when submitted to referendum of unions in January, 1921, was voted down.

(8) A general lockout, May 31st, despite existing contracts; unions ask for a parley. Kenesaw Mountain Landis was chosen as arbiter. Work resumed at the old rates.

(9) Judge Landis insisted on going into both wages and rules, an unexpected action, because he believed some of the agreed conditions to be ‘unlawful’ though some of the rules were custom”—the slow growth

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1 Mr. Victor Olander, secretary of the Illinois Federation of Labor, raised certain objections in regard to the accuracy of certain facts in the material on “racketeering” and labor union violence and brought in Mr. Steve Sumner, Mr. John Fitzpatrick, Mr. E. N. Nockels, Mr. John Clay, and others to confer with us. Three conferences took place in Mr. Olander’s office on the points in question. The exchange of views was advantageous and certain modifications of the text were considered, but no final decision was reached. The urgency of going to press and the absence of Mr. Olander from the city prevented further conferences, so that only a few changes have been made in the text on the author’s responsibility.

2 University of Chicago Press, September, 1925.
Terrorization by Bombs

of years, and insists on a 'new uniform' form of agreement, to which the employers quickly agreed."

The building industry in Chicago, Judge Landis said, had become rotten with manipulative combinations, uneconomic rules and graft, which caused the stagnation of building. His new form was to break the backbone of closed shop regulation as well as exclusive employers' combinations.

Montgomery's article resumes:

"The situation created when Judge Landis rendered his award was practically without parallel in the history of the Chicago building trades. The unions and contractors had entered arbitration proceedings in order to settle a dispute concerning reduction of the minimum wage for skilled workers from $1.25 to $1.00 an hour and for unskilled workers approximately 30 per cent.

"Neither side had expected any such drastic developments as the restoration of differential wage scales, a reduction of the wage scale in a majority of the trades below that which the contractors had offered to pay, a rewriting of the Uniform Agreement in accord with the laws and bias of the arbitrator, an implied dictum that wage scales should be maxima instead of minima as theretofore, and the imposing of a certain ethical obligation upon contractors dealing with unions that had withdrawn from the arbitration, to employ members of these organizations upon no basis other than that which the arbitrator had declared 'would be fair and just.' Business agents generally, as might have been expected, condemned the Landis award, and at the same time considerable disposition was manifested by a no negligible portion of the contractors to forget the new working rules written into the joint agreement, to take advantage of the lower wage scales when possible, but to pay as much as the dollar an hour they had offered the workers (the difference being represented by 'premiums') when necessary, and to get back to the old basis as soon as possible.

"The Building Trades Council officially ratified the award on October 1, 1921, in spite of the opposition led by Harry Jensen of the Carpenters’ District Council. The representatives of seven trades that had not been parties to the arbitration when the award was rendered—the Sheet Metal Workers, the Plasterers, the Painters, the Elevator Constructors, the Glaziers, the Fixture Hangers and the Carpenters—voted against acceptance and they were joined in their opposition by the delegates from the Plumbers’ Union. The system of representation in the Building Trades Council, whereby the smaller unions were given representation out of proportion to their membership, was all that saved the award from repudiation by the entire council—if, indeed, an impartial tabulation of the votes at this meeting would have indicated a ratification.

"Repudiation by the unions:

"Other unions, in the meantime, were repudiating the Landis award. The original seven who were not parties to the arbitration when the award was rendered have always been 'anti-Landis.' They were joined in October by the plumbers. The lathers, cement finishers, composition roofers, slate and tile roofers and hoisting engineers followed the example of the plumbers in repudiating the award. These unions, together with the seven that had not been parties to the final
Illinois Crime Survey

arbitration and those that later were declared 'outlaw' and their trades put on the open-shop list, comprised considerably more than half of the mechanics and laborers in the Chicago construction industry. With many contractors making no secret of their lack of enthusiasm over the Landis award, with unions constantly repudiating it, with 'premium' wages becoming the rule in certain trades, with a very open disposition on both sides to ignore certain of the Landis working conditions, with the 'good' unions that had accepted it finding that in this case virtue was its own reward and its only reward, and with the international officers of the unions with which the Chicago locals were affiliated, urging in some cases a no-quarter fight against the entire award, it looked for a time as though the Landis award might become little more than an award on paper.

"The Citizens' Committee:

"To meet this situation and make the Chicago construction industry '100 per cent Landis' there was formed the Citizens' Committee to enforce the Landis award—the first organized and large-scale intervention in the affairs of the Chicago building trades by parties outside the industry. The committee was organized under the auspices of the Association of Commerce, with the support of many architects and bankers, and its membership was made up of persons having no direct interest in the construction industry, however much interest some of them may have had in the issue of the open versus the closed shop. A program was announced by the committee, the main points in which were:

"Encouragement and protection for Landis employers and unions; sale and use of materials free from arbitrary restrictions, direction of public sentiment against non-Landis unions and contractors, open-shop protection and encouragement, the outlawing of unions not agreeable to the Landis award, placing them beyond the pale of any peaceable negotiation."


Because it is difficult to understand how honest workmen (and in "racketeering," legitimate business men) resolve to carry on campaigns of terrorism and destruction, the following exposition of the internal organization of unions and the interlocking factor between union and contractor graft is quoted from Montgomery:

"Helpful in explaining such graft as has been prevalent in Chicago building trades is an understanding of the attitude of both contractors and union officials toward such practices. The self-justification of the contractor who is a party to graft transactions is simple. Building construction employers, like the rest of mankind, are rationalizing creatures; they justify the means if it attains what is from their viewpoint a good or necessary end. Others pay graft money; the contractor who does not will be unable to get workers, his place may be bombed and his personal safety endangered.

"'Others do it, so I have to,' says the contractor who figures an extra amount for 'strike insurance.' Nor is the attitude of union members more difficult of explanation. The business agent who consistently collects graft money is generally unrepresentative of the rank and file; but once in office, business agents tend to remain there. Like all politi-
Terrorization by Bombs

cians, they build effective organizations. Also, the rank and file are likely to be indifferent toward the 'side activities' of the agent so long as steady work and good wages are forthcoming. Illustrative of the indifference of many of the members is the fact that the average attendance at meetings of some unions is not more than 15 or 20 per cent of the total membership and seldom more than 50 per cent on election nights. Such crooked business agents as there have been have been tolerated because they have delivered the goods and a tradition has grown up that what they 'get on the side' is theirs. Most of the members realize also that the complexities of collective bargaining make the retention of a specialist necessary. The business agent is a necessary institution and the most efficient agent is the one who has been in the game longest. Materialistic considerations dictate that he be retained even if his methods of personal enrichment do not meet with the hearty approval of a majority of the membership. Nor can one ignore the fact that force—force without stint or limit—may have been resorted to occasionally when an agent has been in danger of losing his position.

As a result of the foregoing conditions, a state of war between the Citizens' Committee for the Enforcement of the Landis Wage Awards and the Building Trades Council ensued. The Building Trades' Council then was composed of building trades unions which had revolted against the Landis scale of wages. Some of these trade unions accepted and operated under the Citizens' Committee and others were revolting in May, 1922. It was the campaign of terrorism, launched by this latter group under the "direct actionist" leaders of the Building Trades Council, which caused bombings, slubbings, murders, and incendiary fires in Chicago in 1922 and later.

An early report of the bombing campaign in the Herald and Examiner of May 11, 1922, is as follows:

"The first reprisals conducted against the actions of the Citizens' Committee for the enforcement of the Landis wage awards took the form of slugging. Later, bombing was employed. It was not until after the eighth bomb had been exploded that the significance of the campaign became apparent.

"Bomb No. 9 was touched off on March 15. A week later No. 10 wrecked a south side restaurant. Then an open war was declared between the Citizens' Committee and the 'outlaw' unionists, who heard that for every man working on a Landis award that was slugged two 'outlaw' unionists would be slugged.

"Later bombings became more frequent, their full meaning not becoming very apparent until after the house of Alderman Charles Agnew, 40 East Elm Street, was exploded by a terrific bomb. This bomb, however, was meant for R. R. Donnelley's home, one of the leaders in the Citizens' Committee.

"Bomb No. 11 was exploded on April 5, in the basement of the Gordon Apartment Building, Seventieth Street and Oglesby Avenue. No. 12 came three days later in the furniture factory of Anthony Kalamanitos, 6308 South St. Lawrence Avenue, which is another Landis award concern. Nos. 13 and 14, touched off two days later, partially wrecked the homes of H. P. Reger, 5416 Harper Avenue, and Henry O'Callaghan, 167 North Lorel Avenue. Both men were Landis award contractors."
"No. 15 wrecked the front of the Parise Restaurant, 11560 Front Street, Kensington, which was in the process of reconstruction under the Landis wage scale; this occurred on April 12, just two nights after Nos. 13 and 14 were exploded. On April 26, No. 16 shook the west side when a dynamite blast was set off in a new apartment building at 1230-34 Jackson Boulevard, a Landis award contract.

"No. 17 was touched off three days later, blowing out the front of the Sharp-Partridge Company plant at 2263 Lumber Street.

"Nos. 18 and 19, portions of the 'night of terror' program staged Tuesday night, were touched off at the Tyler and Hippach glass factory, 366-400 West Ohio Street, and the Cuneo-Henneberry plant, 445 West Twenty-second Street."

The above article is an account of the situation as it existed until May, 1922.

A complete list of all the bombing outrages in the building trades, compiled from all contemporary newspaper accounts available, follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-21-1922</td>
<td>Plant of the Edmunds Manufacturing Company at 2016 W ashburne Avenue</td>
<td>Citizens' Committee issued a defiance of the &quot;Convict led&quot; element in the building trade. Council predicted a reign of terror. Detectives looking for President Harry Jensen of the Carpenters' Union, who was suspected of being the author of the bombing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-1-1922</td>
<td>Brick building, 1378 East Sixty-third Street, owned by George Kuffan</td>
<td>Refused to pay a fine of $250, demanded by a man for his employment of Landis Award men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6-1922</td>
<td>52-apartment building under construction at 2344 E. Seventieth Street</td>
<td>Charles Johnson, owner and contractor, fired union men and employed Landis Award men instead; $1,000 damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-10-1922</td>
<td>Henry O'Callaghan's home, 167 N. Lorel Avenue</td>
<td>The O'Callaghan Brothers' firm had been employing Landis men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-10-1922</td>
<td>Henry P. Reger's home, 5416 Harper Avenue</td>
<td>Paid Landis scale to laborers working on his buildings under construction in Woodlawn and Hyde Park.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-12-1922</td>
<td>Parise restaurant, 11560 Front Street, Kensington</td>
<td>Second bombing; first one was on March 20. Building Trades men employed under Landis Award.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-25-1922</td>
<td>Newly constructed building, 1230 W. Jackson Boulevard, owned by G. R. Stevens Printing Company</td>
<td>Built under Landis Award; $3,000 to $4,000 damage.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Terrorization by Bombs

Date               Place                                      Remarks
4-29-1922           Office of Sharp-Partridge & Company, 2263 South Lumber Street —L. E. Partridge announced a week before that he would operate according to the Landis Award.
5- 4-1922           Room 428, Otis Building, 10 S. LaSalle Street, occupied by Citizens' Committee. —Bomb thrown by an agitator opposed to the activities of the Citizens' Committee.
5- 9-1922           Garage of Tyler and Hippach Company, 623 Orleans Street —There was a strike there at the time because the firm wanted to operate under the Landis plan.
8- 2-1922           Rear of Grossman shoe store, 911 E. Sixty-third Street —Building was recently finished and painted by non-union men.
8- 2-1922           Apartment building at 259 West Sixty-sixth Street —Recently decorated under the Landis Award contract.
8- 3-1922           Interior of Tenth Church of Christ, Scientist, 5640 Blackstone Avenue —Church was decorated under the Landis Award.
12-23-1922          Two newly finished houses, 5905 and 5909 West Sixteenth Street —Landis Award carpenters, lathers and roofers employed.
10-18-1923          House at 1046 West Fourteenth Street —$2,000 damage; Landis Award carpenters employed to repair the stairway.
3-19-1925           Unfinished apartment at South Boulevard and Harvey Street —Bankruptcy of the contractor, Kurt R. Beak, is the cause.
4-27-1925           Offices of Rising Decorating Company, 527 S. Peoria Street —Operated under the Landis Award.
10-18-1925          Rooming house, restaurant and barber shops, 1916 Homer Street —$1,000 damage; Landis Award workmen lived in the building.


Constituted authority did not overtake violence in the Building Trades war until the shooting on May 9, 1922, of a policeman, Thomas Clark, which occurred while he was walking his beat in front of the factory of The Tyler-Hippach Company at 623 Orleans Street. A little later the same day, Terrence Lyons, acting police lieutenant, head of a "flivver" squad, was killed while trying to stop three men in an automobile who, it was suspected, were the murderers of Clark.

By order of the state's attorney, wholesale arrests followed. Among
Illinois Crime Survey

those arrested were Big Tim Murphy; Fred (Frenchy) Mader; Cornelius (Con) Shea; known as the “Big Three,” alleged to be the power behind the police murders; Dan McCarthy, known as “Dapper Dan,” a gangster whose name occurs in bootlegging and other operations; and John Miller, an unknown in crime; and twenty-seven others.

A battle over writs of habeas corpus followed and these were granted to all except the “Big Three” and John Miller.

On May 27, 1922, the “Big Three” were released on bonds of one hundred fifty thousand dollars on condition that they would not leave Illinois. Thomas Carey, a millionaire brick manufacturer, went surety for Mader and Murphy. He was also bondsman at this time for a total of ninety persons charged with criminal conspiracy. This suggests the combination between material men in the building trades and trade union chiefs. On June 12, 1922, Con Shea, Dan McCarthy, and Mrs. John Miller (indicted with her husband, John Miller) were admitted to bail of $75,000 each. This type of defendant can raise any amount of bail.

In the battle over the amount of bond, Judge Taylor on June 16, 1922, ordered the prosecution to state its case against the “Big Three,” and Assistant State’s Attorney Godman made the following statement:

1. That the defendants were accessories before the fact;
2. That the defendants were members of the conspiracy, which had for its object the establishment of a reign of terror in Chicago;
3. That as a result of their activity in the conspiracy certain unlawful acts were committed.

Judge Taylor ruled that all the defendants were to be tried jointly.

The defense was most ably represented—Attorney Charles E. Erbstein for Mader; Attorney James J. Barbour for Murphy; Attorney John M. Dickinson for Miller; Attorney John Enright for Shea; and Attorneys Frank Comerford and James R. Quinn for McCarthy. The state, too, had special prosecutors—Elwood Godman and Judge Fred Fakie aided State’s Attorney Robert McMillan. The judge was T. Taylor, Jr.

It required a venire of thirteen hundred to choose a jury.

The opening statement was made by Assistant State’s Attorney Godman in the case against the “Big Three,” Daniel McCarthy, and John Miller. The state was prepared to prove the following charges:

1. That Murphy and Mader had been willing to “iron out” the difficulties between the recalcitrant unions which had rejected the Landis Award and the employers, for a payment of from seventy-five thousand to one hundred thousand dollars;
2. That Mader personally led raids upon buildings being constructed under the Landis Award, in which workers were beaten up;
3. That McCarthy gave Smash Hanson, known as a labor slugger, several sticks of dynamite with instructions as to how it should be used;
4. That the election of Mader as head of the Building Trades Council was accomplished through trickery and intimidation, with the aid of strangers sitting in the hall in company with Murphy;
5. That all the men were guilty of murder as charged in the indict-
Terrorization by Bombs

ment, and that they had instituted a reign of terror in which the murder resulted.

When John Miller took the stand he told of a twelve-hour grilling and brutal torture by the police—the third degree had been used on him. His attorney, who had been appointed by the court to defend him, told the jury that he would seek to prove four things about Miller:

(1) That he was the driver of the car on the night Lieutenant Terrance Lyons was killed;

(2) That he drove under fear of his own life, with a revolver pressed to his neck by the man who did the actual killing;

(3) That he was not a conspirator;

(4) That he had never seen any of the other defendants before the time he met them in court when the trial began.

His testimony tended to prove the above four points.

On August 2, 1922, the case against Con Shea was dropped because the prosecutors admitted that they had insufficient evidence against him.

Murphy's defense, made by Senator Barbour, can be characterized by the following quotation:

"Murphy cannot be held for actions of others. When a man driving on the street is interrupted by a police officer, the man in the car, alone, is responsible. His associates, whether in business or crime, are in no way responsible for a crime committed by him."

The case against Murphy was nolle prossed because of insufficient evidence.

In the cases of Mader, McCarthy and Miller, the jury was deadlocked for fifty-nine hours. The last ballot showed:

Mader ............... Guilty 8; not guilty 4
McCarthy ............... Guilty 8; not guilty 4
Miller ............... Guilty 9; not guilty 3

It was a fruitless effort to convict men whom public opinion held to be notoriously criminal, and this was borne out in part by the ballots of the hung jury. Mr. Crowe, in announcing that the case would be brought up for a second trial, promised further action in labor violence: "I am going to keep the special prosecutors who have been working on these cases and we are not only going to make every effort to get the present case on trial, but we are also going ahead with all the other labor cases."

In the second trial, which opened on October 9, 1922, the state had no new witnesses nor new evidence, and the new trial began in the court of Judge Oscar Hebel. The state presented a transcript of the evidence of the first trial, but in spite of this the trial continued for almost two months. There were certain unavoidable delays. On November 26, the jury returned the following verdict:

Fred Mader .............. Not guilty
Daniel McCarthy ........ Not guilty
John Miller ............ Guilty; 14 years imprisonment

On the first ballot Mader and McCarthy were decided not guilty. Two other ballots followed and a compromise was reached, whereby Miller was given fourteen years in the penitentiary, the minimum sentence upon conviction for murder. The deliberations took one hour.
Illinois Crime Survey

While the following quotation is not a matter of evidence, it sounds typical of the attitudes toward the due process of law. After the judge had pronounced sentence and retired from the court, Mader and McCarthy both rushed to shake hands with Miller, and are quoted as saying:

"We’re sorry. That’s the penalty of being a ‘man.’ If you had told the police the labor unions hired you to bomb buildings you would be a free man and there would be a noose around our necks.”

Miller was persuaded to be satisfied with the fourteen-year sentence. Mrs. Margaret Miller, his wife, was released when the state nolle prossed the charges which connected her with the bombing conspiracy and knowledge of the police murder. The state was unable to convict any of the "Big Three." Miller was an underling. Murphy, Mader, Shea, and McCarthy added another court victory to the long list—they "beat a mighty big rap."

For the sake of emphasis, brief reference is made to some of the testimony by state’s witnesses, which offers a glimpse of the inside working of labor union politics when direct action is the necessary or preferred program. Harry (Smash) Hanson, on the stand in Judge Taylor’s court, told of the efforts of Fred Mader to have Umbrella Mike Boyle shot, to get him out of the labor game; of his own shooting of Isadore Braverman at Mader’s instigation, and of his acquittal later; of the storing of dynamite in the office of the Building Trades Council and the efforts to extort large sums for settling building trades troubles.

Steve Sumner, the business agent of the Milk Drivers’ Union since its formation in 1902, is an esteemed character in labor circles. In October, 1917, when the milk drivers were expressing great dissatisfaction with the wage scale, which was being held at a pre-war level by the contract with the distributing companies, Steve Sumner, then a veteran nearly seventy years old, when asked what steps the milk drivers would take, answered with emphasis, “I am not old enough to predict what action the milk drivers are going to take.” In the union meeting he pointed out that the existing contract called for only twenty-one dollars per week, and encouraged the men to discontinue that wage rate as soon as it could be done without violating the existing contract. In another speech at a pre-strike meeting he said:

“I hopped on and off a milk wagon for twenty-one years and I used to figure on only four hours a day for sleep. I’m against slavery of the booze bottle and the beer bottle as much as any other kind of slavery. I understand Hoyne says I have been slugging. I defy anybody to show up any slugging I ever did, unless they’d call it slugging for me to go into a saloon and kick out any milk driver I found drinking. Buttermilk and milk is all I drink. Tea and coffee are dope and I don’t drink them. That’s why some of the boys call me ‘Buttermilk Steve.'”

In May, 1918, a demand for increased wages was submitted to the employers. A short lockout followed (or perhaps it might better be called a cessation of business for no effort was made to hire non-unionists), lasting
Terrorization by Bombs

a couple of days, during which a settlement was negotiated. The driver's pay check was increased nine dollars per week (an increase of over forty per cent).

"Injunctions are outrageous and un-American. The nerve of these pups, we elect them and they turn on us." This was the basic sentiment of direct action, expressed in emphatic words by Steve Sumner in 1916, for the utterance of which, on October 22, 1918, the Supreme Court of Illinois confirmed the order of Judge A. Baldwin, committing him to jail for sixty days on a charge of contempt of court. Sumner had been sentenced on this charge two years previously, when during the Garment Workers' strike he had allied himself with their cause and expressed the above dictum. When he went to jail he was seventy years of age. Judge Baldwin released him after Sumner wrote him a letter of apology.

But in August, 1921, a jury returned indictments against Steve Sumner, et al., after hearing the testimony of some sixty witnesses. The bills named Sumner, William Near, a fellow business agent of a Milk Drivers' Union, Robert Fritchie, the president, and Louis Misch, the secretary-treasurer. The charges were conspiracy to boycott, to intimidate, to extort, and to commit malicious mischief in restricting the delivery of milk. When the trial was called, the chief witnesses were missing and the cases had to be dropped for lack of evidence.


Up to this point bombing has been treated in its various manifestations in gambling wars, "Black Hand," political conflicts, racial and nationality succession, and labor union tactics, but there is evidence that bombing in and of itself has become a business in Chicago. Two cases are presented which establish the existence of professional bombing gangs or crews that will undertake any job for pay.

Andrew Kerr was a member of Local 402 of the International Union of Steam and Operating Engineers. He was arrested in the early part of 1921, after the bombing of four laundries, which followed the calling off of an engineers' strike in November, 1920. May 19, 1921, he made a confession to the chief of police in which he named prominent bombers and those who hire or contract for bombing, slugging, intimidation, coercion and the direct methods of labor unions. The men named and taken into custody of State's Attorney Crowe's office were:

James Sweeney, 2730 West Polk Street, alleged generalissimo of the city's bombing forces, who Kerr claimed was either directly involved in or had intimate knowledge of all bombing outrages in Chicago in the past year;
Henry Bartlett, 1510 West Polk Street, known to dynamiters as "Soup," underworld parlance for nitro-glycerine;
Albert Peterson, 2015 North Spaulding Avenue, business agent of Local 401 of the Engineers' Union and instigator of bombing and slugging;
Thomas J. Corcoran, 1260 Cuyler Avenue, business agent of Local 402 of the Engineers' Union and treasurer of the International Joint Labor Board; instigator of violence;
Sam Gibson, a member of Local 402, known to police as a dangerous
radical; a member of the I. W. W., alleged participant in bombing and slugging;
Joseph Bangora, alleged slugger and driver of the automobile used by
the dynamiters on their bombing expeditions;
Charles Borigun, a suspect who was seized when found in the company
of the principals;
Charles Busch, a suspect who tried to bribe the detective who arrested
him;
Cornelius Shea, a notorious labor leader, who directed the teamsters' strike years ago, was being sought by detectives at the time, for he was also named by Kerr. He was alleged to have helped Sweeney plant a bomb Wednesday night. He was active in the Engineers' strike and had considerable quantity of explosives which made him welcome to Sweeney.

In the confession Kerr admitted that he personally acted as an intermediary between the union officials and the bombers and sluggers, and had also participated in a number of bombing and slugging excursions.

James Sweeney's Strong Arm Gang had its "hang-out" at the corner of Harrison and Halsted streets. They would accept any job of bombing for pay—they were in the bombing business. Sweeney, Shea and another man bombed the Schreiber Laundry and had also received a list of twenty-five persons in all parts of the city to be slugged. Harry Bartlett, known as "Soup," from the name for nitro-glycerine in underworld argot, was the assistant of James Sweeney, but was discharged later "when he got to drinking and talking too much." Charles Borigun, Joseph Busch, and Joseph Bangora were aids of Sweeney. Cornelius (Con) Shea, according to Kerr, had been a bomber since he was sixteen years old. Shea was now an old man; only recently had he begun operating for the union. Kerr said that he was the messenger boy, the "pay-off," who went along on slugging and bombing expeditions to see that the union was not cheated, and he received fifteen dollars a week strike benefit for this work.

Following the arrests of the men named, except the elusive Con Shea, they were questioned by Chief of Detective Hughes; and James Sweeney admitted that he and Shea would undertake "any kind of a job."

New complaints were added against the same men by the Imperial, Beehive, and Mechanics laundries, which were bombed, according to Kerr, on the orders of the Stationary Engineers' Union officials. The Chicago Laundry Owners' Association brought pressure upon the police to prosecute.

More light on the workings of the Sweeney gang of bombers, which can be employed to undertake "any kind of a job" at any time, was given by Harry (Soup) Bartlett, who also confessed to the state's attorney. He said:

"I met Kerr about two months ago at Van Buren and Halsted streets. Sweeney and I were talking on the corner and then Kerr came up and started to talk to us. I have known Sweeney for about a year and a half. At the time this happened Sweeney was a teamster and I a chauffeur for the Mid-City Express Company. Kerr, Sweeney and I bought a couple of shots (drinks) together. This time we were together about fifteen minutes. About a week later while I was hanging around the corner, Kerr came up and talked to me. We didn't do business then, but two weeks later he told Sweeney and I about a slugging job at
Terrorization by Bombs

the Lincoln Hand Laundry, 5400 Broadway. He said that he would
see that we would get the money for the job. Sweeney, myself and the
chauffeur for the automobile, and a man the union sent along, went out
on the job. The union always furnished the car and chauffeur. After
we came back and told Kerr that we did the job he paid us sixty-five
dollars while we were in the auto. We were then driven to Halsted
and Madison or Halsted and Van Buren."

All of the men named in Kerr's confession, except Shea and Busch,
were placed on trial. It is difficult to understand why these two men were
excepted. James Sweeney and Harry Bartlett were given separate trials
from the others. The jury on November 5, 1921, found Sweeney and
Bartlett "guilty of procuring and having dynamite in their possession."
They were convicted and sentenced to three to twenty-five years by Judge
McKinley. On March 17, 1922, the jury returned a verdict of "not guilty"
for the other men charged with bombing several laundries during the
Engineers' strike in 1920 and 1921. The names of those acquitted were Albert
Peterson, Samuel Gibson, Thomas Corcoran, Charles Borigun and Joseph
Bangora.

22. Same: Joseph
Sangerman's
Bombing Crew.

In the latter part of November, 1925, Fred
Wamquist, Joseph Avanzio and Mrs. Lena Schrock
Rice were caught in the act of planting a bomb at
the store of Peter Descourguex, 3639 Fullerton
Avenue. Following their capture, startling revelations ensued disclosing the
complex ramifications of the so-called "bombing trust."

Joseph Sangerman was a manufacturer of barbers' supplies. He was
the man of money and brains, the directing genius of the bombing trust, the
contractor of bombing. His confession gives the names of the group of
bombers which operated for the bombers' union and could be hired to
frighten, intimidate and destroy little and independent groceries, delicatessen
stores, bakeries, butchers and other tradesmen, in order to force them to obey
the dictation of "racketeer" union leaders.

Fred Wamquist, Joseph Avanzio, Mrs. Rice, Louis D'Andrea, Jack
Davis and George Martini, whose real name was Matrisiano, were the actual
bombing crew hired by Sangerman, who never went on bombing trips. As an
officer in the barbers' union, his specialty at first was the hiring of bombers
to discipline barber shop owners who did not work in agreement with barbers' rules,
but finding that his gang could "turn a trick" effectively and escape
detection, he began to accept commissions in other fields. He would point
out to the bombing crew the place to be bombed and would settle with them
on the price to be paid for the job.

The returns for a bombing for the entire group were as low as fifty
dollars and as high as seven hundred. Martini was the star bomber. The
following bombings, with locations and rates, give some insight into bombing
as a business:

$400 for the bombing of a barber shop in the Cadillac Hotel;
$200 for the wrecking of another barber shop in the Park Ridge Hotel;
$150 for the explosion at the Red Wing Barber Shop, 126 West Chi-
cago Avenue.
Illinois Crime Survey

The grand jury on December 1, 1921, voted true bills on definite evidence of bombings at 723 West Fourteenth Street, 2334 South Western Avenue, 126 West Chicago Avenue, 2670 Lincoln Avenue, and 2136 Wabash Avenue. Judge Lynch set the bail for those held for trial as follows:

George Martini................accused 6 charges........bonds $150,000
John David....................accused 5 charges........bonds 125,000
Joseph Sangerman..............accused 4 charges........bonds 100,000
Louis D’Andrea.................accused 3 charges........bonds 75,000
George W. Mills.................accused 2 charges........bonds 50,000
Frank Schiro...................accused 1 charge........bonds 25,000
Mrs. Lena Rice...............accused 1 charge........bonds 25,000
Mike Abbinanti.................accused 1 charge........bonds 25,000

Lena Rice was placed on probation. Joseph Sangerman died before a court could convict him. Martini, who was never apprehended by the police, was killed by the guns of officers of the barbers’ union. James Rango was arrested but not tried for the killing. Joseph Avancio, Fred Wannquist and Jack Davis pleaded guilty to the charge of malicious mischief and were sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of one to ten years.

In his investigation of the Sangerman gang, Mr. Crowe discovered the system of victimizing owners of small businesses:

“Gangsters now control various so-called business organizations. Any who will not join are bombed. After they are members they pay heavy penalties for incurring the displeasure of their gangster bosses. They are fined at every excuse. Powerful ones in organizations dictate prices, employees and quantity of production to the weaker ones.”

And Mr. Crowe announced¹ his discoveries of “racketeer” campaigns:

1. Hirchie Miller, west side gang leader, indicted on charges of conspiracy, intimidation and assault to commit murder.
2. David Halper, indicted on charges of being one of four men that kidnapped and beat three employees of the Barnett Levin Bakery.
3. The following men were indicted in connection with protective associations of milk dealers, battery dealers, shoe repair men, barbers, bakers, tailors, and cleaners and dyers:
   Steve Sumner, business agent of the Milkwagon Drivers’ Union;
   Henry Buerger and Frank Boyd, business agent’s assistants; Henry Dobizanski and Andrew Zurawski. The charge is the bombing of a dairy owned by Mrs. Jaroez, 1751 West Huron street, after she had refused to join a milk dealers’ association.
   Samuel Rubens, Alfred Boris, Charles Goldstein and Henry Beyers, charged with punishing cleaners and dyers not “right” with the association.
   Charles Carrao, Philip Vinci and Emmet Flood; the latter was formerly an organizer of the American Federation of Labor. These men direct the policies of the Fruit and Vegetable Dealers Association.
   Joe Frickles, owner of a battery shop, and Edward Gierun; threatened Wernes, a business rival of Frickle, and later bombed Wernes’ shop on August 13, 1925.

¹ Daily News, December 1, 1925.
Terrorization by Bombs

William Carrio and Mike Grecco, accused of window smashing.

4. Herman Linneman, chairman of the Chicago Master Barbers’ Association, who was named by Mr. Crowe in his bombing investigation. Linneman was reported to have jumped into the lake to end his life after he was named by Mr. Crowe.

5. Frank A. Scalfaro, business agent of the Master Barbers’ Association; indicted on grounds of threats upon John Bevaque, owner of a barber shop at 38 North Dearborn Street.

6. Frank Schiro, proprietor of a barber shop at 4 North Market Street, indicted for having a hand in bombing.

7. Mike Abbiniati, a barber union’s business agent; indicted with George Martini.

8. Following an investigation on December 5, 1925, the following members of the executive committee of the Retail Cleaners’ Association were named as having a hand in bombing; Ruben Goldberg, Sam Harris, Michael Edelhart, Morton Swee, William Jennings, John Jones, Ben Hirsch and Matt Gross.

Others reported to have been named by the grand jury were: Abraham Gompolski and Max Eisenstein, leaders in the Jewish Master Builders’ Association; F. A. Avery, president of the Automobile Associated Trade; Ben Rice, Joseph Masselo, Henry Belcossette, Rocco Belcossette and Tony Perrotta, who are all lesser lights in protective associations.

9. Officials and members of the executive board of Retail Grocers and Delicatessen Stores Business Men’s Association were named in a true bill charging conspiracy. They were: Philip Goldberg, Louis Becker, Max Drozdowitz, Jack Fox and Joseph Clancy. They controlled all the small stores in the west side through threats.

George Cziziankas was also named on a charge of bombing with intent to kill. He bombed the home of his wife, Mrs. Eva, 1915 W. Nineteenth Street, because of family difficulties.

10. More members of the Retail Cleaners’ and Dyers’ Association were indicted for charges of intimidation by bombs of M. Becker to raise the price of cleaning and dyeing. The persons named were:

James Gorman, Inside Cleaners’ Association; John Skahlen Novelty Cleaners and Dyers; Otto Fellinger, 6827 Merrill Avenue; Adolph Roth, 2417 South Western Avenue; William W. Horcher, 7132 South Chicago Avenue; Charles Bernal, 5119 South Halsted Street; Allan Heald, 7159 Stony Island Avenue; John Clay, president of the Laundry, Cleaners’ and Dyers’ Association; Benjamin Abrams, Inside Cleaners’ and Dyers’ Union; and William Jennings of the executive board of the Cleaners’ and Dyers’ Association.

This bombing trust had been conducting a campaign of destruction against churches, residences, stores, and barber shops. Organizations that wanted rivals put out of business or undesirables frightened out of the neighborhood, or the maintenance of prices of retail trades, could hire these bombers.

George Martini, whose real name is Matricciano, was the son of a Neapolitan immigrant, a barber, first on Halsted and Eighteenth Streets, and later on Taylor Street west of Racine. He was an only son, among many daughters. At the age of sixteen he shot and killed William Gregory.
in front of a west side theater and was sent to Pontiac for that in 1911. He followed crime as a career for fourteen years. In this group of bombers he manufactured the bombs, most of which were made of black powder, but he always had in his possession at least two sticks of dynamite, and while he was living as a fugitive from justice in the rooming house district on the west side and slinking home to his mother or to his wife on South Ashland Avenue near Taylor, he always had his hand on his blue steel Spanish automatic. He conceived his role in terms of operatic melodrama. He cherished a picture of himself, clipped from a newspaper, in which he is called “terrorist.” He was killed while sitting in an automobile belonging to the Hardware Dealers’ Association, in which line many bombings had occurred; and while he was dodging arrest under the many indictments for bombings while a member of the Sangerman gang, his wife was receiving a weekly allowance of sixteen dollars from the Barbers’ Union.

The understanding between him and the remaining members of the crew who were in jail after Sangerman and Mrs. Rice were released was that Martini would raise funds with which to “fix” the case, and though he feared to come near the jail, there were always gangsters committed and others released from jail who constantly carried messages of encouragement to those in jail. Martini had a long experience with the “fixing” of cases. His death was really ascribed to his ambition to become, by coercion, the chief officer of the Barbers’ Union in place of Frank Rango and James Rose. He probably wanted command in order to be able to raise the fund which Rango and Rose refused him.

Rango’s brother-in-law, Capo, was arrested with others when the home of Rosenberg, Democratic Ward Committeeman, was bombed. Bombing was, therefore, not a strange occupation in the family.

The deep regret of Martini’s mother was that she had only one son and there was no one to avenge George.


The reign of violence in Chicago is not limited to the underworld operations of organized vice, gambling and bootlegging. During the last thirty years bombing has been a method of warfare in different conflict situations, as the struggle of an immigrant group like the Italian to obtain political offices held by such powerful bosses as John Powers; the conflict between white and Negro; and the struggle between labor unions and employers.

Two chief points stand out when all these different fields of bombing are considered together:

First of all, the general pattern of events is the same for all:
(a) Bombing as a method of intimidation in a conflict situation, generally of group against group;
(b) The difficulty of apprehending the persons guilty of the bombing;
(c) The immunity, often, from arrest, of the criminal when known; frequent dropping of prosecution if arrested; and the almost invariable failure to convict when prosecuted.

Secondly, the appearance of the same individuals in the different fields of bombings indicates the interlocking nature of a complete system of
organized violence. This is most marked in the rise of the "Strong Arm" gangs or professional bombers, ready to serve as paid retainers in any cause requiring their services. The presence and availability of these gunmen, bombers, and gangsters gives part of the necessary background for understanding their entrance in recent years into a new field—the field of business. The transformation of gunmen, bombers and gangsters into "racketeers" was sometimes at their own initiative, but often upon invitation to solve a problem in competitive co-operation with which many groups of small business men were unsuccessfully struggling.